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Abstract 
This monograph examines the claim that national economic competitiveness, social 
justice and individual prosperity, depend on developing a high-skill, high-wage 
workforce. Based on an analysis of global trends in education, employment and the 
labour market, we challenge the policy focus on upgrading the skills of the workforce, 
as it will fail to meet its policy objectives. Without a broader industrial strategy, high 
skills are a declining source of competitive advantage, given the exponential increase 
in the global supply of ‘knowledge’ workers. Equally, the assumption that it would 
take decades for emerging economies to compete for high-end manufacturing and 
services, including research and development, have been rapidly undermined. Global 
competition is now based on quality and price, transforming the relationship between 
education, jobs and rewards. While we identify a need for further detailed analysis of 
these issues, there is enough evidence to suggest that the human capital assumption on 
which government policy rests is no longer ‘fit for purpose’. 
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Introduction 
The nature and consequences of economic globalisation are widely contested (Ohmae, 
1990; Gray, 1998). Within government and policy circles, it is believed to present 
new opportunities and challenges to both the developed as well as emerging nations 
within the world economy. But what is surprising about much of the current debate is 
that it has generated more political heat than hard evidence. This is because the debate 
is often polarised between the protagonists of ‘free trade’ and those who oppose it for 
various reasons (de Rivero, 2001; Wolf, 2004). 
The purpose of this monograph is not to add our voice to either the pro- or 
anti-globalisation lobby, or to review their relative intellectual merits, but to undertake 
a systematic review of current trends in education, employment and the global labour 
market. This is an urgent requirement as virtually all national governments in both 
developed and emerging economies view the upgrading of skills as key to economic 
competitiveness, social justice and a cohesive society. 1 
In undertaking this review, we will focus on Britain and the United States. 
Political leaders in both countries have extolled the virtues of free trade and flexible 
labour markets. They assert that there are no longer British or American jobs but only 
British and American workers, who must compete with workers from other nations on 
their knowledge, skills and enterprise. Therefore, the prosperity of nations, the 
profitability of companies and the livelihoods of individuals and their families are 
believed to depend on winning a competitive advantage in the knowledge-driven 
global economy. Britain and the United States have staked their future prosperity, 
with all its social ramifications, on out-smarting other nations in the competition for 
high-skilled, high-waged employment. 
The win-win scenario 
We have witnessed a shift in emphasis within the win-win scenario, although faith in 
the mutual benefits of global integration to both developing and developed economies 
remains unchallenged, as do its policy implications. Initially it was assumed that 
while emerging economies will compete on their ‘price’ advantage for low-skilled 
work, ‘quality’ high-skilled, high-waged employment will remain within those 
developed economies with the most innovative, technologically advanced and 
employable people.  Robert Reich states: 
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Skilled labour has become a key barrier against low wage competitions for 
the simple reason that it is the only dimension of production in which 
existing capitalist powers retain an advantage. Technological innovation 
may be bought or imitated by anyone. High-volume standardised 
production facilities may be established anywhere. But production 
processes that depend on skilled labour must stay where it is.2 
In the developed economies, it was assumed that prosperity could no longer be based 
on the low-skilled, high-waged employment that characterised the mass production of 
standardised goods and services in the 1960s and 1970s. New communication 
technologies, cheaper transportation and increasing price competition were already 
leading to the export of low-skilled tasks that could be done at a fraction of the labour 
costs in emerging economies. But it was also assumed that there was little prospect of 
emerging economies such as China and India being able to compete for high-skilled 
jobs, such as research, design and advanced engineering. Initially, the price advantage 
of the less developed economies was viewed as a positive sum game, as it gave them 
an opportunity to develop their economies, at the same time as forcing countries such 
as Britain, Japan and the US to compete on quality rather than price. 
More recently the success of China and India in moving into the production of 
high value-added, high-tech product markets, has caused political leaders and their 
advisors to re-evaluate the win, win scenario. In 2004 the OECD Council of Ministers 
asked their senior advisors to shed light on the issues ‘since solid evidence to 
underpin policy discussion and formulation was scarce’. The subsequent 2007 Report 
acknowledged the key role of multinationals in enabling developing economies, 
including China and India, to move up the value-chain to compete with Western 
companies for high-tech products and R&D investment. However, their policy 
prescriptions re-affirmed a commitment to free-trade, innovation and skills up-
grading, ‘openness to trade and investment and well- functioning markets are the key 
to the upgrading process, this will help move resources from firms and industries that 
are no longer able to compete in the global market to those that are successful’ 
(OECD, 2007). 
The win-win scenario is sustained, but this time it is not through the quality of 
the high-tech goods produced in the West but through the ability of these economies 
to introduce change, innovation and productivity growth. The policy implications are 
to support innovation and entrepreneurship and crucially to produce ‘more highly 
skilled workers’ through education and training policy focussed on life-long learning, 
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to sustain a shift toward more high value-added areas that might remain within the 
economies of the OECD. 
This analysis was reflected in the policy advocated by the UK Prime Minster, 
Gordon Brown (2008), who recently announced that the UK had entered a ‘global 
skills’ race. 
Already our Asian rivals are competing not just in low-skilled 
manufacturing, but in high- tech products and services. Once, we worried 
about a global arms race. The challenge this century is a global skills race 
and that is why we need to push ahead faster with our reforms to extend 
education opportunities for all… In a globally competitive national 
economy, there will be almost no limits to aspirations for upward 
mobility. Globalisation dictates that the nations that succeed will be those 
that bring out the best in people and their potential. And this is the new 
opportunity for Britain. Put simply: in the past, we unlocked only some of 
the talents of some of the people; the challenge now is to unlock all the 
talents of all of the people. 
The scale of this challenge is widely acknowledged in Britain and the US, as widening 
income inequalities since the late 1970s are seen to reflect differences in the ability of 
workers to develop the marketable skills that are highly valued within the global 
labour market. Therefore, the win-win scenario not only assumes that both emerging 
and developed economies will benefit from further global integration, but it also 
assumes a domestic bargain. The route to individual prosperity is education. Through 
the investment of time, energy and money, those people who develop their 
employability within the knowledge-driven economy will derive significant financial 
benefits over the medium term. The challenge of income inequalities can be met by 
raising the education and training standards of socially disadvantaged groups giving 
them the opportunity to compete for the global supply of high-skilled, high-waged 
jobs. The challenge is to outsmart other nations in the ‘knowledge wars’ of the future 
(Brown and Lauder, 2006). 
Do current trends in education, work and the global labour market support this 
optimistic interpretation of the win-win scenario – at least from a British or an 
American perspective? Our argument is that far from supporting the win-win 
scenario, current trends raise urgent questions about the nature of the global challenge 
and its policy consequences. This monograph will present some of the latest evidence 
and conclude with an outline of its broader implications for public policy. 
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High skills: a declining advantage? 
We begin by considering recent trends in educational investments, especially at the 
tertiary level. The argument that a knowledge-driven economy demands a larger 
proportion of the workforce with a university education and with access to lifelong 
learning opportunities has had a major impact on participation rates in tertiary 
education. University is no longer the preserve of elites, as has been the case in many 
OECD countries. Whatever the merits of the economic case for expanding higher 
education, there has been a major expansion across OECD countries. Figure 1 shows 
that there was significant expansion in all of these countries with the exception of 
Germany. Canada was the first country to achieve the target of over 50 percent of 
people aged 25 and 34 to enter the job market with a tertiary level qualification, 
followed by Korea, which has engineered a massive growth in tertiary provision since 
1991. Germany is the exception due to its continued commitment to the dual system 
of workplace and off- the-job training. 
Figure 1: Trends in educational attainment at tertiary level (1991-2005) Aged 25-
34.3 
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Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2003, 2007 
 
There is little to suggest that this expansionary phase will end in the near 
future as most countries benchmark themselves against those with the highest 
participation rates, although its relationship to employment, productivity and 
economic growth remain unclear (Ashton and Green, 1996). It also suggests that the 
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value of educational investments as a source of competitive advantage may not 
deliver what national policy advisers and politicians anticipate: if everyone adopts the 
same tactic, then no advantage is gained; but at the same time such investments 
remain vital as a source of ‘defensive expenditure’ (Thurow, 1977; Brown, 2003). 
Although it may not create the conditions required to become a ‘magnet’ economy for 
high-skilled employment, failure to invest will do little to enhance competitiveness. 
We will return to this issue, but what is also ignored in most debates about 
improving the employability of the workforce are the strategies now being pursued by 
some of the major emerging economies, as it has been assumed that it will take 
decades for them to build the infrastructure required to generate a high-skilled 
workforce.  This view fails to take account of how some of the emerging economies 
have responded to the global challenge. Singapore, for instance, did not become an 
independent city state until the 1960s and has continued to depend on inward 
investment from multinational companies. While Singapore’s competitive strategy 
was initially based on low-skilled, low-waged work, it has since pursued a high-skills 
strategy that has made it the second most competitive economy according to the 
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2008.4 
Table 1: Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) rank 
order for mathematics and science achievement of eighth-graders (13-year-olds), 
2003 
Mathematics Science 
Nation Average Nation Average 
Singapore 605 Singapore 578 
Korea, Republic of 589 Chinese Taipei 571 
Hong Kong SAR  586 Korea, Republic of 558 
Chinese Taipei 585 Hong Kong SAR 556 
Japan 570 Estonia  552 
Belgium-Flemish 537 Japan 552 
Netherlands 536 Hungary 543 
Estonia  531 Netherlands 536 
Hungary 529 USA 527 
Malaysia  508 Australia  527 
Latvia 508 Sweden 524 
Russian Federation 508 Slovenia  520 
Slovak Republic  508 New Zealand 520 
Australia  505 Lithuania  519 
 
Source: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 2003. For notes see 
http://nces.ed.gov/timss/Results03.asp 
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Table 1 shows that students in Singapore are high achievers on international 
tests for both mathematics and science. Singapore has also introduced reforms to 
encourage creative potential and individual enterprise. Given that Singapore has a 
population of four and a half million, it does not pose a major economic challenge to 
Britain or the US. But the collapse of communism, further economic integration and 
advances in information technologies have brought China, India and Russia, along 
with a number of smaller nations, into the global competition for education, 
knowledge and high-skilled employment. 
Figure 2: The expansion of tertiary education in selected emerging and 
developed economies (enrolments), in thousands  
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Source: Compiled by the authors from the Worldbank website: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/cd5.asp 
 
Figure 2 shows that in 2006, China had over ten times as many university 
students as the UK and almost six million more than the US. But perhaps the most 
extraordinary statistic on the expansion of education in China is enrolment to senior 
secondary schools (shown in Figure 3), which witnessed an increase in enrolment rate 
from 26 percent to almost 60 percent since 1990. Figure 3 also shows the participation 
in higher education increased from a little over 3 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 
2006.5 These figures reflect a broader skills strategy captured in an official policy 
statement on employment prospects to 2020: 
It is necessary to fully utilize various education resources, strengthen the 
improvement in human resources quality, direct major efforts to the 
promotion of quality-oriented education, stress cultivation of practical 
abilities, and make efforts in improving education quality, so as to train 
millions of high-calibre workers, thousands of special talents and a large 
number of outstanding innovative talents for the socialist modernization 
drive.6 
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Figure 3: Enrolment rates primary, secondary (junior and senior) and higher 
education enrolment rates for China 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006 (in percentage) 
 
Source: China Education Yearbooks 2001-2006, Ministry of Education of PR China. Taken from 
Cheng, J. Update in Chinese Higher Education Developments, Asia-Pacific Association for 
International Education (APAIE), 
http://www.apaie.org/hoge2008piyo/final_ppt/1-2-1_Jack_CHENG.pdf  Accessed on 26-06-2008. 
 
The expansion of higher education in India is following a similar path. In 2006 
there were almost 13 million in tertiary education, but there are plans for major 
expansion outlined in India ’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) including a major 
increase in central government support for education, representing what Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh views as ‘an unprecedented increase in allocation for 
education in the history of our country’.7  This includes funding for 30 new Central 
Universities, five new Indian Institutes of Science, Education and Research, eight new 
Indian Institutes of Technology, seven new Indian Institutes of Management and 20 
new Indian Institutes of Information Technology. 8 Mr Singh, suggested that a five-
fold increase in education expenditure was required because, ‘it is through universal 
literacy, access to education and knowledge based agricultural and industrial 
development that India must henceforth march ahead to join the front ranks of the 
great nations of the world.’9 
There is little sense of countries, whether in Asia or Eastern Europe, being 
content with doing the ‘body’ work within the global economy while the ‘brain’ work 
is left to the developed economies such as the US, Japan, Germany and Britain. 
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Returning to Figure 2 we can see that since 1990, the combined numbers of degree-
level students in China, India and Russia have more than trebled from a total of 13.9 
to over 45 million students; this is more than double the combined total for the US 
and the UK at 19.8 million. 
Richard Freeman has highlighted the importance of what he called ‘the great 
doubling’ referring to the increasing size of global labour pool from around 1.46 
billion workers to 2.93 billion workers (Freeman, 2006). But there is another great 
doubling. Based on our further analysis of enrolment figures for 98 countries, we 
found that tertiary level enrolments (undergraduate and postgraduate) virtually 
doubled within a decade from 33.4 million in 1995 to 62.9 million in 2005 (See Table 
2).  While these data should be treated as indicative and remembering that enrolment 
figures do not tell us how many actually enter the global job market on an annual 
basis due to high levels of drop-out in some countries, it nevertheless shows that the 
expansion of higher education has not been limited to OECD member states. 
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Table 2: Enrolment terti ary education total for 98 countries, for 1995 and 2005 (in thousands) 
*instead of 1995 
**instead of 2005 
Source: Derived from the Worldbank, Edstats online database, http://go.worldbank.org/47P3PLE940 
Data originates from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).
Country 1995 2005 Remarks Country 1995 2005 Remarks Country 1995 2005 Remarks 
Germany 4 288 4 288  Spain 1 592 1 840  Mozambique 7 28  
Greece 329 647  Sweden 261 430  South Africa 618 735  
Hungary 195 436  Switzerland 148 196  Swaziland 6 6 1996* 
Iceland 7 15  Tajikistan 108 119 1994* Tanzania 13 51  
Ireland 128 187  Turkey 1 174 2 106 1994* Uganda 30 88 2004** 
Italy 1 775 2 015  Ukraine 1 541 2 605  Argentina 1 070 2 117 2004/1994 
Kazakhstan 419 753  United Kingdom 1 821 2 288  Bolivia 189 346 1996/2004 
Kyrgyz Republic 50 220  Canada 1 763 1 327 2004** Brazil 1 869 4 275 1996/2004 
Latvia 44 131  United States 1 4262 17 272  Chile 343 664  
Lithuania 76 195  India 5 696 11 777  Colombia 588 1 224  
Luxembourg 2 3 2004** Nepal 106 147 1996/2004 Cuba 122 472  
Macedonia, FYR 30 49  Botswana 8 11  Dominican Republic 177 294 1996/2004 
Moldova 88 119  Burkina Faso 9 28  Ecuador 203 213  
Netherlands 492 565  Chad 3 10  El Salvador 115 122 1994/2004 
Norway 180 214  Eritrea 3 5 2004** Guatemala 80 112 2006** 
Poland 1 021 2 118  Ethiopia 35 191  Guyana 8 7  
Portugal 320 381  The Gambia 2 2 1994/2004 Honduras 61 123 1996/2004 
Romania 370 739 1994* Ghana 20 120 1993* Mexico 1 533 2 385  
Russian Federation 4 458 9 003 1994* Guinea 8 24  Panama 77 126  
Slovak Republic 92 165  Lesotho 4 8  Paraguay 41 149 2004** 
Czech Republic 192 336  Madagascar 29 45  Peru 672 909  
Denmark 175 232  Malawi 6 5 2004** St. Lucia 3 3  
Estonia 40 68  Mali 10 33 2004** Uruguay 80 103  
Finland 214 306  Mauritania 8 9      
Slovenia 48 104  Mauritius 6 17  Total 3 3288 62 906  
  10 
Figure 4: First university degrees in science and engineering fields in Asia, 
Europe and North America, by field: 2004 or most recent years (thousands). 
Note: Natural sciences include physical, biological, earth, atmospheric and ocean sciences. 
Source: Science and Engineering Indicators 2008 http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/c2/fig02-34.xls  
 
Figure 4 also offers little comfort to those who argue that, even if these 
countries are producing large numbers of graduates, they will lack the quality of 
education received in the West, especially in terms of new scientific knowledge. 
Although the quality of education is likely to vary in countries experiencing rapid 
expansion of educational provision, it is nevertheless the case that Asia is producing 
more engineers and physical scientists than Europe and North America combined. In 
the case of engineering Asia is already producing double the combined number of 
America and Europe. 
In the US, close to half of those gaining a doctoral degree in engineering, 
mathematics and computer science are foreign students. Some of these remain within 
the developed economies, but others return to their indigenous countries, adding to the 
stock of highly skilled workers (Saxenian, 2002). Alone, South Korea graduates as 
many engineers as the US and, according to recent evidence from a US Business 
Roundtable report, by 2010 more than 90 percent of all scientists and engineers in the 
world will be living in Asia, although such figures should be treated with a high 
degree of scepticism.10 
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In the UK, home students make up less that half those studying for 
postgraduate degrees in science subjects. Even in Computing, a discipline that stands 
at the heart of high-tech industry, there has been a significant decline in the proportion 
of UK domiciled students, at the same time as a major increase in the category of non-
EU domiciled students (see Figure 5). The number of UK computing students in 
higher education fell by 22.3 percent in three years between 2003 and 2006, a decline 
of over 30,000 students. During the same period the numbers taking A-level 
computing fell by 33.9 percent from 8,488 to 5,610.11 
Figure 5: UK Full-time postgraduates of s elected science subjects and domicile 
for 1996/1997 and 2006/07 
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency, Students in Higher Education Institutions, 1996/1997 & 
2006/07 
 
The World Bank also estimates that Russia has the third-highest numbers of scientists 
and engineers per capita in the world and other Eastern European countries also have 
a growing proportion of well-educated scientists and IT specialists (Trombly, 2003). 
Elika Trifonova (2003) observed that: 
because the Russian education system continues to be heavily weighted 
toward math and science, Russian scientists are often considered the best 
in the world. Consequently, Russian IT companies present an attractive 
investment opportunity because these businesses can draw upon Russia ’s 
large ‘intellectual resource’ of world-class scientists and engineers. 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
96/'97 06/'07 96/'97 06/'07 96/'97 06/'07 96/'97 06/'07 96/'97 06/'07 96/'97 06/'07 96/'97 06/'07
Biology Chemistry Physics Mathematics Civil
Engineering
Mechanical
engineering
Computer
science
UK domicile Other EU domicile Non EU domicile
  12 
Equally, in an interview conducted with a leading global corporation that hires large 
numbers of engineers and scientists, we were told that the company experienced little 
problem finding enough highly educated workers due to the supply from emerging 
markets. But it was also stated that in engineering it is Western nations that will need 
to work hard to catch up: 
It’s not a problem to get enough highly educated people in these 
markets… Education level usually is very good. This… applies to Russia, 
it also applies to China. Educational level is pretty high in particular in 
Russia where people are very well educated. Although they have to get 
accustomed to, let’s say, to the way business is done from a more western 
perspective, that’s quite normal. The consequence for… western countries 
is that they have really to work hard to catch up. We can see this also in 
the United States.12 
In Britain, the chances of catching up look remote. Despite the major expansion of 
higher education since the mid-1990s, the numbers of UK domiciled students 
studying mechanical engineering and chemistry also fell along with computer science, 
although there was a slight increase in the numbers studying physics (See Figure 5). 
To make matters worse, a significant number of STEM (science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics) graduates enter jobs in non-STEM related occupations. 
There are now twice as many students studying business and administration than 
engineering and technology.13 A similar picture emerges in the US where there has 
been a 20 percent decline in the number of engineering degrees awarded compared to 
1985.14 
It could be concluded that the problem, at least in STEM subject areas, reflects 
this decline in student numbers, but this may not be the case as a recent analysis of US 
data makes clear. Harold Salzman (2007), argues, ‘The available data indicate that the 
United States’ education system produces a supply of qualified STEM graduates in 
much greater numbers than jobs available. If there are shortages, it is most likely a 
demand-side problem of STEM career opportunities that are less attractive than career 
opportunities in other fields… Standard labor market indicators do not indicate any 
shortage’ (2007:2). This conc lusion is based on evidence showing that the STEM 
workforce in the United States totals about 4.8 million, which amounts to less than a 
third of the 15.7 million workers who hold at least one STEM degree (Salzman, 
2007:8). 
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A rising demand for knowledge workers? 
The trends in education discussed here would not represent a major problem if 
employment within the world economy continued to expand and if a growing 
proportion of these jobs were high-skilled. While the global economy has seen growth 
in GDP, and total employment has grown by 441 million between 1997-2007, official 
figures presented in Table 3 show that unemployment has also increased during the 
same period. In 2007 it stood at 190 million; an underestimate of real levels of 
unemployment, especially in less developed economies lacking state funded 
unemployment benefits. It alas takes no account of the 2008 financial crash, which 
will inevitably result in significant job losses around the world. Nevertheless, it does 
not appear to support Jeremy Rifkin’s argument that we are losing jobs all over the 
world, although the composition of the workforce may well be changing, as he cites a 
study by Alliance Capital Management that found that manufacturing jobs are even 
being eliminated in China. Indeed, the rate of decline in China was reported to be 
faster than in any other country. Between 1995 and 2002, China lost more than 15 
million factory jobs, constituting 15 percent of its total manufacturing workforce 
(Rifkin, 2004). 
Table 3: Global labour market indicators, 1997 and 2007 
 Female  Male  Total 
 1997 2007* 1997 2007* 1997 2007* 
Labour force (millions) 1071.7 1267.7 1625.0 1895.3 2696.7 3163 
Employment (millions) 1001.6 1186.1 1530.3 1787 2531.9 2973.1 
Unemployment (millions) 70.2 81.6 94.6 108.3 164.8 189.9 
Youth unemployment 12.3 12.5 12.0 12.2 12.1*** 12.3*** 
Labour force participation rate (%) 52.9 52.5 80.4 78.8 66.7 65.6 
Employment-to-population ratio 
(%)** 
49.5 49.1 75.7 74.3 62.6 61.7 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.5 6.4 5.8 5.7 6.1 6.0 
 
*2007 data are preliminary. 
**Employment-to-population ratio: the number of employed persons as a percentage of the working-age 
population. This indicator measures the proportion of the population who could be working (the 
working age population) who are working, and as such provides some information on the efficacy of 
the economy to create jobs. 
***Due to lack of data, the total youth unemployment rates are calculated as the mean male and female 
unemployment rates, assuming equal sizes. 
Source: International Labour Office Global Employment Trends for Women - March 2008 p.25-26  
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/47 
  14 
In a context of growing concerns about demographic trends and the ageing 
workforce, it is sobering to note that a significant proportion of the unemployed are 
young people. In the region of 85 million people between the ages of 15-24 were 
officially unemployed in 2005.15 There is no shortage of young people to contribute to 
the national economies of those countries that confront a rapidly aging population 
(Britain and America are in the low-risk category), but some young people are living 
in the wrong places (Jackson and Howe, 2003). The global oversupply of labour is 
also characterised by the fact that it is increasingly educated. 
The issue of jobless growth was a hot issue in the US. George Bush was the 
first President since Herbert Hoover in the early 1930s to preside over a net loss of 
jobs in a four-year term of office (Seager, 2004). But it is not only the issue of job 
creation that is important here, but the quality of these jobs. We need a clearer picture 
of the demand for high-skilled workers in the developed economies given that much 
of the investment in education and training is based on the idea that we have entered a 
new global economic era based on knowledge, innovation, technologies and new 
ways of doing business. 
This new economy has been variously described as the informational, digital 
or knowledge economy. Whatever label is applied, it is widely believed that there has 
been an exponential increase in the demand for high-skilled workers. Some 
commentators estimate that around half to three-quarters of employees are 
‘knowledge’ workers in developed economies. It is also claimed that in the region of 
80 percent of new jobs require a university degree within the British economy (Brown 
and Hesketh, 2004; Keep and Mayhew, 2004). 
If the demand for high-skilled workers is consistent with the supply, then there 
is less reason for concern, as the expansion of education would mirror the 
technological upgrading of the workforce. The problem for the proponents of the 
knowledge economy is that the evidence fails to support the argument that today’s 
economy requires a significant, let alone exponential, increase in demand for high-
skilled workers. 
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Table 4: Employment by education and training category, USA, 2000-201016 
Most significant source of 
education or training 
Number Percent distribution 
  2006 2016 2006 2016 
Total, all occupations 
(thousands) 
150 620 167 754 100.0 100.0 
      
First professional degree 1 970 2 247 1.3 1.4 
Doctoral degree 2 025 2 462 1.3 1.5 
Master’s degree 2 167 2 575 1.4 1.5 
Bachelor’s or higher degree, 
plus work experience 
6 524 7 117 4.3 4.3 
Bachelor’s degree 18 585 21 659 12.3 13.0 
Associate degree  5 812 6 899 3.9 4.2 
Post-secondary vocational 
award 
7 901 8 973 5.2 5.4 
     
Work experience in a related 
occupation 
14 579 15 889 9.7 9.6 
Long-term on-the-job training 11 489 12 200 7.6 7.3 
Moderate-term on-the-job 
training 
27 230 29 248 18.1 17.6 
Short-term on-the-job training 52 339 56 951 34.7 34.4 
 
Source: Arlene Dohm & Lynn Shniper, Employment Outlook: 2006-16 Occupational Employment 
Projections to 2016, Monthly Labor Review, November 2007 p.103. 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/11/art5full.pdf 
 
Although many of the jobs with the fastest rate of growth in the American 
economy require a college or university degree, most Americans will continue to 
work in occupations that require low levels of education and training. Table 4 shows 
that the proportion of the workforce requiring a bachelor’s degree or higher is 
expected to rise by just 1.1 percentage point between 2006 and 2016, from 20.6 
percent to 21.7 percent. This amounts to around one in five of all jobs, whereas the 
majority of the workforce (52%) will remain engaged in activities that require, at best, 
‘moderate’ work-related training. Indeed, the proportion of jobs requiring virtually no 
training is not anticipated to decline, representing over a third of the American 
workforce. There is little prospect here of a new economy emerging on the basis of 
‘knowledge’ work. 
Official occupational projects for the UK have shown a consistently higher 
demand for managerial, professional and technical occupations. This may reveal more 
about the way occupations are classified, especially the role of manager, and the way 
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projections have been calculated, than they do about the realities of the UK 
workforce. This is an issue that is in need of urgent investigation as there seems to be 
a significant mismatch between official figures that have led to claims that up to 80 
percent of new jobs will require a university education, and other sources which 
present a somewhat different picture. 
Table 5: UK Occupational changes and projections using SOC 2000 major 
categories, in share of total (as percentage)  
 
Source: Rachel Beaven, Derek Bosworth, Richard Lewney and Rob Wilson (2005) Alternative Skills 
Scenarios to 2020 for the UK Economy, Cambridge Econometrics and the Warwick Institute for 
Employment Research, p.33 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/D/E/alternative_skills_scenarios_chapters.pdf 
 
Table 5 shows a 5 percent point increase in demand for those jobs that 
typically require university credentials (managers, senior officials, professionals, 
associate professionals and technicians), rising from a combined total of 41.4 in 2004 
to 46.4 percent in 2020. Moreover, unlike official US statistics, elementary 
occupations are projected to decline from 11.3 to 7.9 percent of jobs during the same 
time period.  This would involve the UK creating over twice the proportion of 
professional and managerial jobs than the US if current UK projections are to be 
met.17 
Given these projections, the Leitch Review of Skills has set various targets for 
improving the skills profile of the workforce, including a commitment to a 50 percent 
participation rate in higher education by 2010 in line with government policy. A key 
assumption of the Leitch Review is that the UK needs to improve its skill profile 
relative to other developed economies. Based on current projections shown in Figure 
6 it suggests that the UK will have 43 percent of its workforce in the high skills 
category, with the USA at 50 percent; Japan at 56 percent and Canada at 60 percent. 
 1984 1994 2004 2009 2014 2020 
1. Managers and senior officials 12.1 13.6 15.3 15.9 16.6 17.0 
2. Professional occupations  8.4 10.0 11.8 12.6 13.5 14.0 
3. Associate professional and technical 10.1 12.0 14.3 14.7 15.1 15.4 
4. Administrative and secretarial 15.0 14.8 12.6 11.9 11.1 10.6 
5. Skilled trades occupations  16.4 13.6 11.4 10.8 10.3 10.1 
6. Personal service occupations  4.1 5.6 7.5 8.1 8.6 8.9 
7. Sales and customer service occupations  6.1 7.0 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.2 
8. Machine and transport operatives 11.8 9.7 7.9 7.5 7.1 6.9 
9. Elementary occupations  16.1 13.7 11.3 10.0 8.7 7.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  17 
Figure 6: Projected skill compositions of the  populations (aged 25 to 64) of a 
selection of OECD countries for 2020 
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Note: Low skills = no qualifications and skill level 1 combined; Intermediate skills= skill level 2 and 
level 3 combined; High skills= skill level 4 and higher. See endnote18 
Source: Leitch Review of Skills; Prosperity for all in the global economy  - world class skills. Final 
Report, December 2006, HM Treasury, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/leitch_finalreport051206.pdf 
 
Figure 7: UK Trends in the Balance of Supply and Demand for Qualifications, 
1986-2006 
 
See: endnote 18 for definitions of skill levels  
The balance of supply (+) or demand (-) at each level is the difference between the number of people 
holding highest qualifications at that level and the number of jobs with highest qualifications 
requirements at that level plus an estimate of the number of vacancies at each of thes e qualification 
levels. 
Source: Alan Felstead, Duncan Gallie, Francis Green and Ying Zhou, Skills at Work, 1986 to 2006, 
ESRC Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance based at the Universities of 
Cardiff and Oxford, 2007. 
http://www.skope.ox.ac.uk/WorkingPapers/2006SkillsSurvey.FinalDraft4.pdf p.80 
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The problem is that such analyses seem to bear little relationship to the reality 
of national or global job markets. There seems to be little account of changes in the 
global distribution of high skilled work, to say nothing of the potential impact of new 
technologies to reduce, as well as increase, the demand for high skills (Brown, Lauder 
and Ashton, 2008). If the United States was to achieve its projection in Figure 6, it 
would confront a huge problem of over-qualification given the anticipated demand for 
degree level workers presented in Table 4 above. 
The Skills at Work surveys (1986-2006) in the UK also questions this blind 
commitment to supply side solutions found in official policy statements from the New 
Labour government in the UK. Figure 7 shows the balance sheet between the supply 
of qualified workers and the demand for qualified labour from employers. As Felstead 
and colleagues (2007) suggest, ‘the most notable change in recent years has taken 
place at graduate level. The difference between the supply of graduates and the 
numbers of jobs requiring graduates for entry into them, standing at 1.1 million people 
in 2006, was less than 300,000 in 1986. This change is largely the result of the supply 
of graduates outpacing the growth of jobs where degrees are perceived by jobholders 
to be required for entry. ’ (2007:60). Figure 7 also reveals a huge undersupply of 
people who require no qualifications for job entry. This suggests that the problem of 
over-education is found across the UK workforce, although jobs requiring no formal 
qualifications may offer some on-the-job training. 
Hesketh (2005) has analysed the demand for ‘knowledge’ workers in the UK 
based on what employees actually do rather than the qualifications held by employees 
or what is required to get a particular job.19 This analysis draws on categories 
originally formulated by Robert Reich (1991; Brown & Hesketh, 2004). The category 
of ‘knowledge workers’ (Reich called them ‘symbolic analysts’) includes corporate 
managers and administrators; managers/proprietors in agriculture and services; 
science and engineering professionals; teaching professionals; health professionals; 
other professional occupations; science and engineering associate professionals; 
health associate professionals; and other associate professional occupations.20 
The category of knowledge workers is distinct from ‘in-person service’ (IP) 
workers, which includes secretarial occupations, personal service occupations, buyers, 
brokers and sales representatives and other sales occupations; and also from ‘routine 
production’ (RP) workers, which includes clerical occupations, skilled construction 
trades, skilled engineering trades, protective service occupations, industrial plant and 
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machine operators and assemblers, drivers and mobile machine operators, other 
occupations in agriculture, forestry and fishing and other elementary occupations. 
Figure 8 shows a significant increase in knowledge- intensive jobs in the 1980s and 
1990s, from approximately 20 percent of the UK workforce in 1971 to 28 percent by 
the beginning of the 21st century, but there is little evidence of a further increase to 
2010. The question of the future demand for knowledge workers can also be studied 
by considering the rates of increase/decrease for each of the three categories of 
workers for the UK economy as a whole. Figure 9 shows that during the 1980s, the 
rates of increase for knowledge workers were four times that of the growth in the total 
number of jobs in the UK economy. However, this rate of change was not maintained 
in the 1990s and there is little expectation of a further acceleration in the demand for 
knowledge workers in the near future. 
Figure 8: Job classifications, all UK jobs, 1971-2010 
Soure: Hesketh, A. (2005) The Knowledge-Based Economy in Wales: A Comparative Analysis, 
National Assembly of Wales. 
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Figure 9: Percentage changes within categories within periods (UK) 
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Offshoring: From low to high skills 
The failure of the developed economies to create the numbers of high-skilled jobs to 
meet the requirements of mass higher education is now being fuelled by global trend 
towards ‘offshoring’ – the movement of jobs from developed to emerging economies 
given the price advantage of the latter.21  The increasing importance companies attach 
to cross-border labour arbitrage is outlined by Kenichi Ohmae (2000:64) in the 
following terms: 
Arbitrage simply means the playing off of one supplier against another, to 
continually bring the price of goods and services down, and the quality up 
– not through control or negotiating, but simply through choice. If you are 
dissatisfied with the old sources of supply, you eliminate the difficulties 
by finding new partners that operate in a less fettered way. Giving up your 
fettered partners may mean making some people unhappy, eliminating 
some middle people, or changing your habitual practices, but the savings 
are so great that the new choice is necessary. No business can justify 
refusing the advantages of an arbitraging choice. 
To date, this has been part of the win-win scenario, as companies have shifted an 
increasing share of low-skilled work to low-waged economies. The cost savings that 
can be achieved are illustrated in Table 6, which shows the relative hourly 
compensation costs for production workers in selected counties. Although it does not 
include China, where high levels of global production have been concentrated, it 
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reveals significant differences in labour costs in Sri Lanka, Philippines and Mexico 
compared to Denmark, Germany or the US - although we should not under-estimate 
the hidden costs of offshore activities (Meisler, 2004). 
Table 6: Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers (in U.S. Dollars) 
 1992 2000 2006 
Brazil NA 3.50 4.91 
US 15.95 19.65 24.18 
Japan 16.13 21.93 20.20 
Sri Lanka* 0.40 0.48 0.54 
Mexico 2.16 2.07 2.75 
France 17.32 15.43 24.90 
Germany** 23.89 22.67 34.21 
Denmark 20.41 20.13 35.45 
Philippines 0.78 0.77 1.07 
Singapore  4.91 7.30 8.55 
Korea, Republic of 5.21 8.23 14.72 
Taiwan 5.12 6.19 6.43 
 
*2005 instead of 2006 
**1993 instead of 1992 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2008 
It is precisely such differences in wages that have led some Western 
governments to give up the fight for low-skilled jobs enabling emerging economies to 
benefit from new export-oriented employment, at the same time that the developed 
economies are left to compete for the global supply of high-skilled, high-waged jobs. 
But, as we have already seen, what Western governments are coming to recognise is 
that the competition for skilled employment is no longer restricted to a privileged 
minority of wealthy nations – some of the emerging nations including China and India 
have entered the competition for high-skilled work in key sectors of the global 
economy. These are countries with populations of over a billion people. This presents 
a major problem for the developed economies, because of the prospect of increasing 
areas of skilled work being subject to long-term price competition. Labour arbitrage 
no longer stops with factories or call centres. 
In the US, for instance, eight out of ten fast-growing jobs that required 
advanced training were related to information technology, a sector that is being 
successfully targeted by countries such as India.22 This trend toward the offshoring of 
high skilled jobs is inevitable given the relative costs of employing a chip design 
engineer in selected countries.23 Table 7 shows that a chip designer in the US costs 
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over four times more than a designer in Korea and ten times or over the costs 
associated with the same workers in India and China. 
Table 7: Annual cost of employing a chip design engineer, 2002 (US dollars) 
Location  Annual cost* 
United States 300 000 
Canada 150 000 
Ireland 75 000 
Republic of Korea 65 000 
Taiwan 60 000 
India 30 000 
China (Shanghai) 28 000 
China (Suzhou) 24 000 
 
*Including salary, benefits, equipment, office space and other infrastructure. 
Sources: UNCTAD, based on PMC-Sierra Inc, Burnaby, Canada (for Silicon Valley, Canada, Ireland, 
India) cited in Ernst 2005. Taken from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World 
Investment Report 2005, p.174. 
 
Grave warnings have also become commonplace in the case of financial 
services. According to the consultancy firm A T Kearney, 500,000 jobs within the 
sector will move overseas by 2008. This represents about eight percent of those 
working in the sector and an estimated US$30bn in annual savings for the companies 
that move offshore. This report also noted that ‘relocations will involve a wider range 
of high-end internal functions… including financial analysis, research, regulatory 
reporting, accounting, human resources and graphic design. Until recently, offshore 
job transfers have primarily focused on back office functions such as data entry, 
transaction processing and account reconciliation. ’ This report concludes that ‘any 
function that does not require face-to-face contact is now perceived as a candidate for 
offshore relocation’.24 
Chris Gentle at Deloitte Consulting suggests that around 13 million people are 
employed in the financial services sector in the mature industrial economies. He 
estimates that companies expect to transfer around two million jobs offshore by 2008, 
the bulk of which will be from North America and Western Europe, with the promise 
of savings estimated at US$138bn (see Box 2). Again these transfers will not be 
restricted to back-office functions, but will include front-office areas such as 
application development, accounting and finance and operation processing and 
administration. 
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It is very difficult to gain a comprehensive picture of offshore activities [see 
Boxes 1 & 2]. Estimates vary, for example McKinsey Global Institute based on 
‘representative’ sectors in advanced economies estimated that only about 11 percent 
worldwide of private sector employment might potentially be offshored to developing 
countries.25 On the other hand in the ICT sector, the OECD estimates that ITC-
enabled offshoring may affect up to up to 20 percent of employment.26  In what is the 
most comprehensive study to date, Blinder has developed an index of ‘offshorability’ 
to calculate the number of jobs that are potentially offshorable in the US.27 
Essentially, he differentiates between jobs which are personally delivered (janitors, 
child-care workers and surgeons) and those which are impersona lly delivered (call-
centre operators and scientists). Using a comprehensive US data base he calculates 
that between 22 percent and 29 percent of all US jobs are impersonally delivered in 
that they can potentially be delivered electronically over long distance with little or no 
degradation in quality, and are therefore potentially offshorable. Of course not all 
these jobs will be offshored in the same way that not all manufacturing jobs have been 
offshored but the potential is there for a major change. But Blinder’s study, also found 
‘little or no correlation between an occupation’s “offshorability” and the skill level of 
its workers (as measured by educational attainment or wages)’.28 Similarly an OECD 
Report (2007) on offshoring and employment found that skilled jobs were no longer 
safe from being sent offshore as it increasingly spreads to technology- intensive 
industries such as software, computer services and other information technology 
services.29 Clearly we are now in the early stages of a process that is  affecting all skill 
levels. 
This poses a major problem for the developed economies as their economic 
policies have been based on the assumption that investments in education and training 
would translate into a growing proportion of high-skilled, high-waged jobs. What is 
yet to be fully grasped is that the magnetic effect of the supply of high skills is not 
necessarily limited to the glitter and glitz of the developed economies. Indeed, in an 
increasingly competitive marketplace where companies are searching for new ways to 
meet the demands of Wall Street and the City, and to remain profitable following the 
credit crunch, the prospect of skilled workers at a much lower price may prove 
irresistible. As Craig Barrett, chief executive of Intel observed, ‘to be competitive, we 
have to move up the skill chain overseas.’30 
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Box 1: Evidence on offshore activity in information technologies and financial 
service sectors: quotations  
Source Quote 
Andrea Bierce, 
A T Kearney (2002) 
“Any function that does not require fac e-to-face contact is now 
perceived as a candidate for offshore relocation.” 
Ravindra Datar, principal 
analyst for IT services at 
Gartner India Research and 
Advisory Services (2003) 
“The economic necessity of outsourcing to other locations where 
one can get work cheaper and better is likely to outlive any 
opposition to outsourcing to offshore locations.” 
John Challenger, CEO of 
outplacement firm 
Challenger, Gray & 
Christmas  (2003) 
“There is no difference sending work from San Francisco to San 
Jose over the internet than sending it from Bangalore to San Jose 
over the internet, so there is going to be declining pay for 
technology workers in a global marketplace.” 
Marcu Courtney, chief 
organiser for the Washington 
Alliance of Technology 
Workers in Seattle (2003) 
“Every single job is up for grabs these days.” 
Andrew Grove, chairman of 
Intel (2003) 
“Is software and services next? It’s a very valid question and it 
would be a miracle if it didn’t happen.” 
Jim Foley, professor at 
Georgia Tech’s College of 
Computing (2003) 
“This is now knowledge work toward the top of the food chain, 
as opposed to unskilled or semiskilled work.” 
Supid Nandy, vice president 
for Europe at Wipro, the 
India-based outsourcing 
provider (2003) 
“Over the last 10 years the mindset on India has changed from 
outsourcing non-critical, stand-alone, well-defined systems, to 
outsourcing mission-critical systems.” 
Mark Kobayashi-Hillary, 
author of Outsourcing to 
India: The Offshore 
Advantage (2003) 
“In India offshore work now includes accountancy services, 
equity research for banks, para-legal research for lawyers, and 
medical graduates writing up UK-based health research work. I 
was in Bangalore recently and visited one engineering and design 
company which is carrying out all the R&D development for 
Pratt and Whitney aircraft engines in the USA. ” 
Rob Muth, HSBC’s head of 
global resourcing (2005) 
“The further you go in to high-value work, the more it is going to 
become a team effort between people in high-cost countries and 
those in lower-cost ones.” 
Dieter Ernst, senior fellow in 
the Economics Study Area of 
the East –West Center 
Research Program, US-Asia 
Pacific Council. 
(2006) 
“It is time to correct earlier claims that only low-level service 
jobs will move offshore and there is little evidence of a major 
push by American companies to set up research operations in the 
developing world. Innovation offshoring goes far beyond the 
migration of relatively routine services like call centers, software 
programming, and business process support-the subject of current 
public debates on “outsourcing.” Beyond adaptation, innovation 
offshoring in Asia now also encompasses the creation of new 
products and processes.” 
Phil Morris, managing 
director of EquaTerra in 
Europe (2008) 
“Business people are making the decision to outsource to India 
because they cannot find the same resources in the UK.” 
Malcolm Frank, Cognizant 
vice president of marketing 
and strategy (2007) 
“Offshoring is likely to disappear as a term, and pointed to the 
fact that Accenture has more Indian than American employees in 
its business, and that IBM is the largest private employer in India, 
with 70 to 80 thousand Indian associates. When those multi 
national firms have moved to that footprint, it is just sourcing for 
the industry.” 
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Box 2: Evidence on offshore activity in information technologies and financial 
services sectors: predictions and research 
Source Message 
Deloitte Research 
(2003) 
World’s 100 largest financial services companies indicate they 
expect to transfer an estimated $356bn of their operations and two 
million jobs offshore over the next five years. 
Amicus 
(2003) 
Predicts that 200,000 call centre and back-office processing jobs 
can be expected to leave British soil by the end of the decade. 
Ovum Holway 
(2003) 
Forecasts that between 20,000 and 25,000 jobs may be lost in the 
UK IT industry over the next few years as a direct result of work 
moving offshore. 
Mark Zandi, economist (2003) Calculates that 995,000 US jobs have been lost to foreign 
employment since the last recession began in March 2001. 
Forrester 
(2002) 
Estimates US businesses will send 588,000 service jobs abroad by 
2005, 3.3 million by 2015. Computer-related service jobs will 
suffer some of the worst losses: 473,000 in the next 12 years. 
NASSCOM 
(2003) 
Estimates that India’s IT-enabled outsourcing industry currently 
employs around 171,000 workers, and predicts that number will 
grow to 1.1 million by 2008.The US accounted for 90 per cent of 
the outsourcing industry’s $2bn in revenue for the year ended 
March 31. 
A T Kearney 
(2003) 
 
Their study predicts that US financial services firms will move 
more than 500,000 jobs overseas over the next five years. This will 
involve a wide range of high-end internal functions. 
Fisher Center Research 
(2003) 
They set the outer limit of potential direct job losses because of 
outsourcing at 14 million. This is 11 per cent of all occupations. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2005) 
 
Their survey of more than 150 senior executives of financial 
services firms worldwide finds that the percentage of respondents 
who expect their firms to offshore up to ten per cent and 20 per 
cent of their workforces respectively is set to virtually double by 
2008. 
Economist Intelligence group 
(2004) 
 
Their survey of 104 senior MNC executives revealed that 71% of 
the executives cite the ability to exploits pools of skilled labour a 
key benefit to globalising R&D. 
The Financial Express (2007) Reports that the world’s largest financial services firm Citigroup 
Inc plans to move 9,500 positions to India and other low-cost 
locations especially for equity research, investment banking and 
back-office transaction-related activities. 
A.T. Kearney Global Services 
Location Index (2007) 
 
Their findings strongly indicate that key to maintaining and 
enhancing long-term competitiveness for offshore destinations lies 
in skills development, infrastructure investment and the regulatory 
environment—not in attempts to control wages. Failure to improve 
the skills of the work force and the business environment will 
likely translate to a loss of competitiveness in the fast-moving 
remote services business. 
XMG (2007) 
 
Expects the global outsourcing market for IT, business process 
outsourcing, and call centre services to grow by 19.3 percent to top 
US$297 billion in 2007. By 2010, the market is projected to be 
worth US$450 billion. 
Gartner (2007) Offshore IT services spending will grow 40 percent in the United 
States and 60 percent in Europe in 2008. 
The Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu’s Global Financial 
Services Industry (2007) 
Estimates there has been an 18-fold increase in the average 
number of staff each financial institution has employed offshore in 
four years, from 150 in 2003 to 2700 in 2006. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
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This is consistent with findings from our international study of global 
corporate strategy and the future of skills, which revealed how multinational 
corporations (MNCs) are establishing high-skilled operations in emerging 
economies.31 As one leading engineering corporation told us, there are some highly 
specialised products that they can only make in the US and Germany, but there has 
been a significant narrowing in the performance of operations and factories around the 
world: ‘those in emerging countries are catching up fast and this is making it more 
difficult for plants in the West. It’s really a bit of a rat race.’  Research in China also 
revealed that many enterprises had already adopted the latest high-performance 
management practices, which flourish in the context of a highly educated labour 
force, enabling them to produce high value-added goods at much lower costs (Venter 
et al., 2002). In view of this it is not surprising that a survey of the offshoring 
activities of American and European companies by Couto, et al. (2006) found that 
although companies are primarily driven by the potential for cost reductions, there has 
been a significant increase in the importance of offshoring as a way of gaining access 
to skilled labour (see Figure 10). 
The survey by Couto, et al. also challenges the claim that offshoring will lead 
to job losses in the developed economies. On the bases of research evidence from 537 
public and private sector organisations they suggest that companies that outsourced 
R&D activities from the United States or Europe also increased the numbers of R&D 
jobs in their ‘home’ countries (see Figure 11). However, although they argue that 
offshoring does not necessarily lead to job losses, Figure 11 also shows that many 
other areas of skilled activity does lead to job losses in IT (37%), Finance/Accounting 
(46%) and Human Resources (46%). 
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Figure 10: The key reasons offshoring has evolved beyond cost reduction (2004-
2006) 
Source: Vinay Couto, Madhadeva Mani, Arle Y. Lewin and Carine Peeters, The Globalization of 
White-collar Work; The Facts and Fallout of Next-Generation Offshoring, Offshoring Research 
Network, Duke University for Booz, Allen, Hamilton, 2006. p.3 
 
Figure 11: Offshoring implementations that did NOT lead to job losses by 
function 
Source: Vinay Couto, Madhadeva Mani, Arle Y. Lewin and Carine Peeters, The Globalization of 
White-collar Work; The Facts and Fallout of Next-Generation Offshoring, Offshoring Research 
Network, Duke University for Booz, Allen, Hamilton, 2006. p.4 
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The impact of offshoring on employment will continue to be highly contested 
given a lack of consistent data, and there is no doubt that its impact will be more 
concentrated in certain sectors such as IT, financial services or automotive. It is also 
claimed the IBM now has more researchers in India than it has in the United States.32 
While it is important to gain an accurate picture of the nature and scale of offshoring, 
to date the focus has been on the transfer of jobs from Western multinationals to low 
cost locations, but this ignores the fact that there are new companies and new jobs 
being created in countries including China and India, directly competing for high 
value work in the developed economies. It also ignores the fact that leading 
companies from developing economies will also offshore to Western economies to 
gain access to domestic markets and new technologies. 
Our analysis of the 100 largest transnational companies based on assets 
(excluding transnationals in the finance sector) shows that over half (52.1%) of their 
15.1 million employees were ‘foreign’ workers in 2005 (See Figure 12). This 
represents a 4.2 percentage point rise from 1995 when 47.9 percent were ‘foreign’ 
employees. One of the problems with these data is that only forty companies 
consistently ranked in the top 100 between 1995 and 2005. When data for these forty 
companies were analysed separately we found that the proportion of foreign workers 
increased from 47.6 to 57.6 over the decade (see Appendix 1). Figure 12 also shows a 
significant increase in foreign assets controlled by leading transnational companies, 
increasing from 41.4 percent to 52.1 percent during the same time period. 
Figure 12: Share of foreign employment and assets of top 100 non-financial 
MNCs for 1995, 2000 and 2005 (in percentage) 
Note: for 1995: only 93 companies (7 missing data) for assets 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 1997, pp29-31; 2002, pp.86-88; 2007, pp.229-231. 
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Table 8: Assets and employment for 21 transnational corporations from 
developing economies (millions of dollars, number of employees) 
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2002, pp.100-101; 2007, pp.232-233. 
 
When we turn to transnational companies from developing economies we also find 
significant evidence of globalisation. In five years between 2000-2005, the proportion 
of ‘foreign’ employees increased from 28.1 percent to 44.5 percent, based on a sample 
of 21 companies who where consistently in the top 50 companies domiciled in 
‘developing’ economies (See Table 8; Appendix 1). If this trend is maintained it 
suggests that companies from countries including China, India, Russia, and Brazil will 
increase their use of offshoring over the coming decade or so. The form this will take 
is an issue that requires urgent investigation. However, evidence from our global 
skills project shows how companies from developing economies with global 
ambitions are constructing a high value, low cost model in their attempt to compete 
for global market share. These cost pressures will not be limited to the indigenous 
workforce and are likely to be reflected across their global operations (Ashton, et al. 
forthcoming). This is an important issue as the globalisation of high skilled work is 
not only a question of how far offshoring will lead to a decline in demand for middle 
class managers and professionals in the West, but it is also likely to have an impact on 
job quality, including compensation packages.  As differences in productivity narrow 
between operations in different parts of the world, the cost and working conditions of 
Western employees are no longer the global benchmark. The benchmark will gravitate 
towards high-skilled but lower-waged economies rather than those in Western Europe 
and North America. 
Indeed, this is not simply a matter of ‘following the business’, there is a 
deliberate strategy by leading companies to establish leading-edge operations in 
parallel to those in the developed economies. This gives them global flexibility and 
 Foreign 
assets  
Total 
assets  
Share foreign 
assets of total 
assets (%) 
Foreign 
employment 
Total 
employment 
Share foreign 
employment 
of total 
employment 
(%) 
2000 113 582 373 317 30.4 157 084 0 558 685 28.1 
2005 260 949 734 763 35.5 453 865 1 019 874 44.5 
Growth 
2000-2005 
(%) 
229.7 196.8  288.9 182.5  
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continuity if there are industrial relations problems/underperformance in a specific 
regional cent re, but it also enables companies to point to their lower-cost operations in 
the emerging economies when negotiating with employees in the West. Perhaps these 
companies have little alternative if they are to remain competitive, but the 
implications for Western workers are becoming clear, as a senior executive in a 
German multinational told us: 
We have to drive innovation, we have to be at the leading edge at 
reasonable cost… That’s it. And this can be transferred to the labour 
market. We have, most of all, to try to get higher skills at reasonable cost 
and high flexibility. 
Although the global high-skilled, low-waged workforce will be concentrated in 
emerging economies it may become a prominent feature of the occupational structures 
of developed economies.  Managers and professional workers in Western economies 
are losing their economic shelters that protected them from foreign competition. 
Again, we were told that global labour standards will ‘tend to converge’ and as 
differences in operational performance between developed and emerging economies 
continue to narrow ‘we can anticipate a narrowing of income inequalities between 
countries but at the same time individual wage differentials will increase’. 
It is important to understand that this is not a uniform process affecting 
workers in the West in the same way. Rather, those in senior executive positions or 
who can succeed at selling their knowledge, insights or patents to global businesses 
will continue to be generously rewarded, even if many others with similar expertise 
find their wages and benefits under pressure. Therefore, rather than a win-win 
scenario, we anticipate increasing differentiation in the incomes and wealth of 
‘knowledge’ workers in Britain and the US, which will be discussed below. This 
poses a challenge to those that assert that human capital is at a premium in the 
knowledge-driven global economy. While some ‘knowledge’ workers are likely to 
prosper, many other managers and professional will not.33 
The early experiences of outsourcing and offshoring have led some companies 
to the conclusion that the development of global webs of competence requires a 360-
degree re-evaluation of business processes and corporate human resources. Sourcing 
for global competitiveness is based on a detailed documentation of what the company 
does, that require the codification of tacit knowledge, linked to a shift towards global 
standardisation or alignment within companies. 
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If the twentieth century brought what can be described as mechanical 
Taylorism characterised by the Fordist production line, where the knowledge of craft 
workers was captured, codified and re-engineered in the shape of the moving 
assembly line by management, the twenty-first century is the age of digital Taylorism. 
This involves translating knowledge work into working knowledge through the 
extraction, codification and digitalisation of knowledge into software prescripts and 
packages that can be transmitted and manipulated by others regardless of location 
(Brown, Lauder and Ashton, 2008; forthcoming). It raises the intriguing question of 
the extent to which ‘knowledge’ work can be standardised and its potential impact on 
the demand for knowledge workers. 
The globalisation of research and development (R&D) 
The implications for the above analysis for public policy will be reserved until the 
concluding section, but recent trends in the internationalisation of R&D suggest that 
transnational companies are also increasingly experimenting with advanced R&D 
facilities in a number of developing economies. The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) suggests that: 
Until the 1970s the vast majority of developed-country FDI [foreign direct 
investment] abroad was resource- or market-seeking in nature. In the 
1980s and 1990s, developed-country firms increasingly sought to take 
advantage of cost differences in different production locations by building 
up global production networks to produce for regional and world markets 
(efficiency-seeking FDI). In recent years, another kind of trend in FDI 
from developed countries has emerged as companies also engage in R&D 
activities abroad.34 
Most of this foreign investment was in other developed economies, ‘but lately, 
developing countries like China and India are becoming increasingly important as 
hosts for R&D activities by developed-country TNCs [transnational corporations]’ 
(UNCTAD, 2005:89). In UNCTAD’s survey of leading TNCs, China was identified 
as the most attractive prospective R&D location 2005-2009, followed by the US, 
India, Japan, United Kingdom and the Russian Federation (2005: 153). 
Motorola has invested around US$3.8bn since it entered the Chinese market in 
1987, including US$1 billion in R&D. The company has over 10,000 employees, with 
over 3,000 in R&D in the country. 35 The number of foreign-affiliate R&D centres in 
China totalled 700 by the end of 2004, including companies such as Microsoft, Nokia, 
GE, IBM, Siemens, Dupont, General Motors, Philips and Toshiba.36 In addition to the 
  32 
spend of foreign MNCs the Chinese government is also increasing its spend on R&D. 
Figure 13 shows that China, Singapore and Korea have all significantly increased the 
share of gross domestic expenditure on R&D between 1996 and 2006. 
Figure 13: R&D spending as share of Gross Domestic Expenditure (GERD) for 
selected countries, 1996, and 2006 (percentages). 
 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI): 2008/1 edition. 
 
This shift in the global distribution of R&D is presented in Table 9. It shows the share 
of key countries and regions in the total R&D spend between 2006 and 2008. This 
Table reveals a decline in the share of the U.S. from 32.7 percent to 30.1 percent, a 
similar decline in Europe’s percentage share and an increase in China’s share from 
13.5 percent to 17.9 percent. Table 9 also shows a major difference between China 
and India, as the latter has remained static with a global share of 3.7 percent. 
Table 9: Share of total global R&D spend, 2006-2008 (percentage) 
 2006 2007 2008 
US 32.7 31.4 30.1 
Asia 36.9 38.8 40.8 
China 13.5 15.6 17.9 
Japan 13.0 12.8 12.4 
India 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Europe 25.2 24.6 23.9 
 
Source: 2008 R&D report, R&D magazine, September 2007 p. G3 
http://www.rdmag.com/pdf/RD79GlobalReport.pdf 
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Attracting high-skilled jobs or high-skilled workers? 
The above discussion does little to support the idea that investments in the nation’s 
talent will be enough to attract international companies offering large numbers of 
high-skilled, high-waged jobs. Yet there does appear to be a different kind of 
magnetic effect, whereby qualified workers in emerging economies are attracted to 
work in the developed economies. In the European context, the most visible evidence 
of this trend is the change from 15 to 27 member states within the European Union 
that has enabled workers from the relatively low-waged economies of the former 
Soviet Union to compete for jobs in Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands. 
Research by Deutsche Bank predicts that EU enlargement will lead to around three 
million people moving to Western Europe from Central and Eastern Europe by 
2015.37 
The magnetic polarities of skills and jobs may operate in the opposite direction 
to that assumed in the win-win scenario: rather than attract high-skilled jobs, it may 
attract high-skilled workers. Indeed, many OECD countries have bought into the 
rhetoric of a global war for talent. Florida is typical of this line of argument when he 
asserts that: 
The United States of America is now facing its greatest challenge since 
the dawn of the Industrial Revolution…. The core of this challenge 
is…the new global competition for talent, a phenomenon that promises to 
radically reshape the world in the coming decades. No longer will 
economic might amass in countries according to their natural resources, 
manufacturing excellence, military dominance, or even scientific and 
technological prowess. Today, the terms of competition revolve around a 
central axis: a nation’s ability to mobilize, attract, and retain human 
creative talent. Every key dimension of international economic leadership, 
from manufacturing excellence to scientific and technological 
advancement, will depend on this ability. (Florida, 2005:3) 
Such ideas have led the United Kingdom to introduce an Australian and Canadian 
style, points sys tem, aimed at attracting high skilled worker at the same time as 
reducing the numbers of less skilled workers from outside of the EU. Such moves are 
often justified on grounds of an aging workforce; skilled shortages in key areas such 
as engineering and science; and the need to recruit the ‘best of the best’ to drive the 
British economy (Brown and Tannock, forthcoming; Rudiger, 2008). 
One of the problems with importing skilled workers it that it may reduce the 
incentive for companies to invest in the training of indigenous workers and may 
encourage employers to reduce the cost of indigenous knowledge workers, given that 
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migrants, irrespective of skill level, typically do the same jobs for fewer rewards and 
inferior contracts of employment. Even in areas where there is increased demand for 
high-skilled workers, there is a growing propensity to import qualified labour rather 
than invest in the skills of the less qualified and socially disadvantaged. This has led 
to political pressure to reduce the numbers of H-1B and L1 visas issued to foreign 
workers in the US, and political pressure could also build in the UK as unemployment 
rises. The Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, recently concluded that ‘we 
have found no evidence for the argument, made by the Government, business and 
many others, that net immigration – immigration minus emigration – generates 
significant economic benefits for the existing UK population’ (House of Lords, 
2008:5). The Report goes on to state, ‘we do not support the general claims that net 
immigration is indispensable to fill labour and skills shortages’ (ibid:5) 
Figure 14: Share of foreign labour force of total labour force, for selected OECD 
countries, 1988a and 2005 (in percentage) 
 
a1989 for Belgium, 1990 for the United States, 1991 for Italy, Australia and Canada 1992 for Japan 
*Foreign-born 
Sources: OECD, SOPEMI, International Migration Outlook, 2007 edition p.63,OECD, SOPEMI, 
Trends in International Migration, 2000 p.41 (See OECD for country details). 
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Figure 14 shows the inflows of foreign workers into selected countries 
between 1988 and 2005. This reveals that the United States, Canada, Switzerland, 
Australia and Luxembourg, all have over 15 percent of ‘foreign’ workers, with 
Luxembourg having close to half its workforce within this category. There has also 
been an increase in the UK during this period, but this does not capture the recent 
acceleration in the numbers of foreign workers entering Britain since 2005. 
Immigrants comprised 12 percent of total UK workforce in 2008, with over half of net 
immigration concentrated in London (House of Lords, 2008: 15). These figures take 
no account of the number of foreign workers illegally entering countries including the 
US, Germany or the UK. However, the scale of this trend should not be exaggerated 
when compared to the 36 million people who left Europe in search of a better life 
between 1871 and 1915 (James, 2002: 11). 
It is also difficult to obtain recent data on immigration and skills, though the 
proportion of skilled immigrants across OECD countries is rising. Figure 15 shows 
the proportion of professional and technical migrants from both inside and outside the 
OECD. As it relies on national census data, it fails to capture recent trends but it does 
offer an indication of national variations and the extent to which countries depend on 
‘foreign’ highly skilled workers. What these figures do not show is how high skilled 
migrants are often concentrated in specific occupational sectors such IT, education or 
medicine. 
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Figure 15: Employed professional and technical migrants* from OECD and non-
OECD economies, by OECD country of residence**, 2000 or 2001 (As a 
percentage of total employed professionals and technicians in the country of 
residence) 
Notes38 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2007 
http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doifiles/922007081P1G15.xls   [accessed 8 July 2008]. 
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The ‘brain drain’ of skilled workers from emerging countries, such as doctors, 
nurses, teachers and IT workers, can also have negative consequences for the 
countries they are leaving behind. This is far from a ‘win-win scenario’ for many 
developing economies, although in the medium term, there may be some advantages, 
if they receive advanced professional training and return to their ‘home’ countries to 
work (Saxenian, 2006). But for many emerging economies, the negative consequences 
of the human trafficking of skilled workers are clearly evident. There was a 1,000 
shortfall in the number of nurses needed in South Africa in 2004, but it was losing 300 
nurses a month. Meanwhile, in a three year period (2000-2003), 40,000 overseas 
nurses registered in the UK – mostly from the Philippines, South Africa, Australia and 
India. The US has projected a million nursing vacancies by 2010. This has led 
Thembeka Gwagwa, chief officer of the South African Nurses’ Association, to 
conclude that the overseas recruiters know they are going too far, but are ultimately 
driven by profit: ‘as long as they make money they don’t care what they are doing to 
the health care of our nation’ (Carvel, 2004). 
This brain drain of high skilled workers can therefore leave developing 
economies with a lack of the critical skills required to attract foreign inward 
investment. At least 40 percent of Filipinos are living on less than $2 a day and 
unemployment has risen to 22.7 percent in 2007 (Andriano, 2008).39 Remittance 
accounts for around 13 percent of the Philippines GDP but it tends to encourage 
consumer spending rather than create the conditions for export-driven growth. The 
brain drain to the developed economies, at least in part, accounts for the lack of 
skilled workers in health, aviation, mining, shipping and port operations. The 
problems in the health sector are stark as 85 percent of the country’s trained nurses are 
OFW (overseas Filipino workers). David Llorito observes that ‘what really ala rms 
health policy makers is the new trend of doctors becoming nurses – the so-called 
“nursing medics” phenomenon – so they can more easily leave the country and work 
abroad’.40 
The knowledge dividend: winners and losers  
It is often suggested that human capital has increased in economic significance to the 
point where it has become as important to contemporary society as land was to feudal 
society and financial capital to the industrial revolution (Drucker, 1993; Neef, 1998). 
Robert Reich, noted that in 1920 more than 85 percent of the cost of a car went to pay 
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routine labourers and investors, by 1990 these two groups received less than 60 
percent. Similarly, of the cost of a computer chip, 15 percent is divided between the 
owners of the raw material, equipment, production facilities and routine labour, the 
other 85 percent goes to educated labour including designers, engineers and patent 
attorneys.41 This conforms closely to the win-win scenario as it harbours an 
evolutionary model of economic development in which the value of knowledge work 
will continue to rise at the expense of the low skilled and the owners of capital as 
profits come to depend more on brainpower. 
However, the protagonists of the win-win scenario have failed to understand 
the realities of knowledge capitalism (Brown, Lauder and Ashton, 2008). Amongst 
other things they ignore the fact that the globalisation of corporate skill webs can be 
used to play-off different groups of knowledge professionals scattered around the 
globe whether within the same (or different) organisations.42 In the same way that 
they play off different groups of skilled production workers and their unions to reduce 
the price of labour, so too they have been able to play off knowledge professionals to 
reduce their labour costs. 
What this means is that in spite of all the talk of the increasing power of the 
knowledge worker, employers have in fact gained the ‘upper hand’ in the relationship 
between capital and labour. This has been well established through the work of 
researchers at the IMF and others such as those at the global consultancy Morgan 
Stanley. Commenting on their research into the consequences of globalisation, 
Stephen Roach, Chief Economist at Morgan Stanley, remarked that the win-win 
scenario for globalisation was not working. While many workers in the developing 
world were seen to benefit from economic globalisation, he argued that in the 
developed economies it’s a different story as benefits: 
have accrued primarily to the owners of capital at the expense of the 
providers of labor. At work is a powerful asymmetry in the impacts of 
globalization and global competition on the world’s major industrial 
economies - namely, record highs in the returns accruing to capital and 
record lows in the rewards going to labor… The global labor arbitrage has 
put unrelenting pressure on employment and real wages in the high-cost 
developed world - resulting in a compression of the labor income share 
down to a record low of 53.7% of the industrial national income in mid-
2006. With labor costs easily accounting for the largest portion of 
business expenses, this has proved to be a veritable bonanza for the return 
to capital - pushing the profits share of national income in the major 
countries of the industrial world to historical highs of 15.6% in 2006.43 
  39 
Figure 16: Labour income shares for advanced economies* (weighted) , 1980-
2005 (percentage) 
 
*Advanced economies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States; weighted using series on GDP in U.S. dollars from the World 
Economic Outlook database. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook: Spillovers and Cycles in the Global Economy, April 2007, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/c5/Fig5_7_1.csv 
 
The same trend was found by researchers at the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) whose work revealed a steady decline in the proportion of the gross national 
product that goes to labour as opposed to capital. As Figure 16 illustrates labours’ 
share has seen a steady decline since the early 1980s. This has been more pronounced 
in Europe and Japan (about 10 percentage points) than in Anglo-Saxon countries 
(about 3-4 percentage points) (IMF 2007:168) but the trend is the same across all the 
industrial countries. Of course, the fact that global economic growth has created a 
larger economic pie means that many workers have seen real increases in their living 
standards over this period, but this does not detract from the fact that capital has been 
able to use its enhanced global capabilities to increase its share of the wealth created 
by the global economy. 
There are a number of factors at work to produce this squeezing of labours’ 
share. For example, technological change introduced by employers is generally seen 
as important in reducing unskilled work and therefore the proportion of income going 
to unskilled workers. In the case of skilled workers however, analysis by the IMF 
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team revealed that offshoring by employers was responsible for reducing their share, 
while government labour market policies have had some impact in mitigating the 
overall amount of the fall experienced by labour (IMF, 2007:178). However, they also 
argue that much of the drop in the income share is explained by the declining fortunes 
of unskilled workers. Again, the evidence is far from conclusive and more research is 
required to tease out differences in industrial sectors as well as differences within 
occupational groups. 
Given existing trends there seems little doubt that the forces, which have 
enabled employers to increase their share of wealth, are likely to be sustained in the 
near future. As we have seen both China and India have massive reserves of labour, 
both skilled and unskilled which have yet to be utilised by employers, while other 
countries in Asia and Africa have yet to be incorporated into the global economy and 
labour force. As wages and costs rise in specific regions and countries within the 
developing economies we will observe the same trends experienced by the developed 
economies, namely the progressive movement of production to areas where labour 
costs are lower. 
 
The death of human capital (as least as policy-makers have come to understand 
it) 
The win-win scenario ultimately rests on the premise that investing in high skills is 
the route to prosperity for all. Official education and economic policy documents 
make frequent reference to the relationship between education and income 
inequalities. These inequalities are no t only seen to reflect the new realities of the 
global labour market – which rewards those with scarce skills, knowledge and talent 
and penalises those with few marketable skills – but also a failure to improve the 
employability of a large proportion of the workforce, given that if the employability 
of the workforce were to improve, it would result in a rapid narrowing of income 
inequalities. Here the analysis of the problem of wage inequalities is closely related to 
its remedy: if many workers are in low-skilled, low-waged jobs or unemployed, it is 
because they lack marketable skills; therefore the solution is to give them incentives 
and opportunities to become more employable through education and training 
initiatives, such as those designed to increase entrepreneurial skills, improve adult 
literacy or improve education provision for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
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Figure 17: International returns to education: private real rates of return, 
university-level education (ICED 5+6) , 2003 44 
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The view of education as the route to economic prosperity is typically 
supported by evidence of a graduate premium for those with a university education. 
Figure 17 shows the latest OECD figures for the rates of returns to education for 
individuals with university level education in selected countries. It shows that the 
value of the graduate premium is subject to significant variation between countries. 
The returns of both men and women in Britain were much higher than in countries 
such as Denmark and Sweden. Such differences pose a problem for the assumed 
relationship between learning and earning, as income inequalities are taken to reflect 
the value of skills in the global labour market, we would expect all the leading 
economies to exhibit the same basic pattern (see below). The figures for Britain and 
the US may not reflect the higher value attached to ‘knowledge’ but the inferior 
quality of the job opportunities for non-graduates compared to those available in 
Denmark and Sweden. 
But the political arithmetic of ‘high skills = high wages’ leaves the 
protagonists of the win-win scenario with a serious ‘adding up’ problem. Fred Hirsch 
observed, ‘what each of us can achieve, all cannot’ (Hirsch, 1977; Brown, 2006). Just 
because ‘on average ’ those with higher qualifications get higher wages does not mean 
that all those with higher qualifications will get higher wage, because people are not 
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paid for their credentials but for their employment. Therefore, unless there are more 
jobs offering higher wages, the ‘average’ income of graduates will decline. 
The value of credentials depends on their scarcity value. The more illustrious 
the university, the better the grade, the fewer people that have a degree, the greater the 
market value of the credential. Therefore, past returns are no guarantee of future 
performance as market conditions change – not only as more people gain access to 
graduate qualification but for the reasons discussed above. Moreover, headline figures 
of the returns to education, such as the widely touted figure in the UK of a £400,000 
dividend in lifetime earnings for those with a university degree (Brown and Hesketh, 
2004), assumed the ‘average’ graduate, but the realities are that there are significant  
‘within’ group differences in the ability of graduates to cash in on their ‘human’ 
capital. 
Figure 18: US male hourly wages by decile within educated groups, 1973-2005 
(2005 dollars) 
 
Note: low, median and high earners refer to, respectively the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile wage. 
Source: Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, Sylvia Allegretto , The State of Working America 
2006/2007, Economic Policy Institute, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 
2007, p.160. 
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Figure 19: US female hourly wages by decile within educated groups, 1973-2005 
(2005 dollars) 
 
Note: low, median and high earners refer to, respectively the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile wage. 
Source: Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, Sylvia Allegretto , The State of Working America 
2006/2007, Economic Policy Institute, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 
2007. p.160. 
 
Based on evidence from the US, Figures 18 and 19 give a very different picture to the 
mantra of ‘learning is earning’. Indeed, if the idea of a graduate premium were 
calculated on the economic value of a college degree in 1973 as opposed to its current 
market value, the ‘headline’ story would look very different. They show that it is only 
male and female college graduates in the ‘higher earner’ category (90th percentile) that 
enjoyed any significant growth in real income since 1973.  In other words, the vast 
majority of college graduates have received little additional ‘premium’ on their 
investments in their human capital compared to college graduates in the 1970s, 
although they continue to earn more than those without a college education. 
But even here the picture is complex, as the high-earning category among 
those who left high school before going to college was better paid than the median 
income for college graduates (although the differential has narrowed in recent years). 
Female college graduates continue to earn less in each of the earning categories than 
males, but perhaps the most striking difference is the way male and female top earners 
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have raced away from the rest. They now earn around twice as much as the median 
college graduate of the same sex. This underlines the need to avoid talking about the 
‘average’ college or university graduate – for when it comes to rewards within the job 
market, some are far more equal than others.45 
The evidence in the UK is more difficult to evaluate due to a lack of suitable 
data, but the results from two highly respected national surveys cast doubt on current 
assumptions about the financial benefits of higher education. These surveys enable us 
to identify trends and calculate net income for those in their early thirties, precisely at 
the time when many will be thinking of buying a house and raising a family, although 
this data is now dated and fresh analyses are required. Table 10 shows the net income 
per hour of low-, median- and high- income graduates and non-graduates. By looking 
at per hour income, we can take into account those who are working part-time. This is 
important because it offers a better understanding of the financial circumstances of all 
graduates, rather than only those in full- time employment. There are several striking 
conclusions to be drawn from this analysis (Lauder, et al., 2005). 
The median earnings for both male and female graduates have experienced a 
slight decline in real earnings and in terms of the graduate premium, the lifetime 
difference between the median graduate and non-graduate was £166,000 (net income). 
In 2000, the median graduate earned 36 percent more, rather than the 50 percent 
premium reported in The Future of Higher Education (DfES, 2003:59). However, this 
represents a 17 percent decline, from a premium of £200,000 in 1991 (a drop from 44 
percent to 36 percent) in the differential between the median graduate and non-
graduate. 
Table 10 also shows that high-earning non-graduates achieved a 17 percent 
advantage over the median graduates (a lifetime difference of £108,000) and 80 
percent more than low-earning graduates.46 This analysis clearly demonstrates the 
problem of basing our understanding of graduate incomes on the ‘typical’ graduate, a 
problem further highlighted when we examine differences in earnings within the 
graduate population. 
The same data set also shows that the differences in earnings within the 
category of ‘graduates’ was twice as large as those found between graduates and non-
graduates. This amounts to a £374,000 lifetime difference between median- and high-
earning graduates, which equates to a 60 percent difference. Since 1991, there has 
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been an increase in graduate income differentials, although this was slightly larger for 
males when the earnings of median and high-earning graduates are compared. 
A review of the evidence on graduate earnings in the UK by Green et al. 
(1999) also found that the variance of graduate pay has increased since the mid-1980s 
(Green, et al., 1999). In a later analysis of graduate pay using longitudinal data Green 
and Zhu (2007:3) found that ‘the dispersion of returns substantially increased for both 
man and women over the period 1994-2006. While the benefits of graduate education 
at the top end of the residual wage distribution have increased a little, at the bottom 
end they have sharply decreased.’ What they also found was that there had been an 
increase in graduate over-qualification during the current decade, which was 
associated with a sharp increase in the financial costs of being overqualified. Those 
graduates who were in jobs for which a degree was not required on entry were being 
paid less than those in jobs for which degrees were required. 
 
Table 10: UK graduates and non-graduates: net hourly pay (employees full-time 
and part-time), 30-year-olds 
All All Women Men   
1991 2000 1991 2000 1991 2000 
Low 3.6 3.7 3.4 3.6 4.0 3.9 
Median 5.4 5.5 4.7 5.2 6.0 5.7 
Below degree 
High 8.8 8.8 7.7 8.2 9.4 9.4 
Low 5.1 4.9 5.0 4.6 5.4 5.3 
Median 7.8 7.5 7.7 7.0 8.1 7.9 
Degree or higher 
High 12.0 12.0 11.3 10.8 12.5 13.0 
 
*Low =10th percentile, High = 90th percentile. Adjusted for age. 
Source: Lauder, et al., (2005), based on 1991 National Child Development Study and 2000 British 
Cohort Study, 1991 Wages indexed to April 2000 prices. Sample does not include the self-employed. 
 
This evidence also supports other research that has found enduring gender 
inequalities in the rates of returns to higher education. In Purcell’s analysis of equal 
opportunities and earnings among graduates in the UK, she found that the differential 
between women and men increased in line with occupational status from 12.5 percent 
among manual and routine operatives to 16.5 percent among managers and 
administrators (Purcell, 2002:17). Research in the United States also demonstrates 
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huge variations in incomes, depending on gender and race. White men with a 
bachelor’s degree earn around $12,000 a year more than black or Hispanic men with 
the same qualification. The difference between white men and Hispanic females 
widens to over $20,000.47 
Overall, the evidence suggests that income inequalities in Britain and the 
United States cannot be explained simply in terms of shifts in global returns to 
knowledge, skills and insights. If wage inequalities are a reflection of the returns to 
skill in an increasingly global labour market, we would expect to find a similar pattern 
in all OECD countries. Figure 20 shows that at the same time that the US – and to a 
lesser extent the UK – experienced a race to inequalities, some countries, including 
France and Japan, experienced a narrowing of differentials and in other countries 
there was little discernible change during this period. It is of course possible that these 
differences reflect a time lag and other countries will witness a similar increase in 
wage inequalities in the future (Lauder, et al., 2008). Figure 20 offers initial support 
for this view in the case of Germany, as there has been a recent and significant 
increase in income inequalities. Nevertheless, significant societal differences remain 
in the way labour markets and employment are organised and incomes distributed. 
 
Figure 20: Trends in earnings dispersion in selected OECD countries* 
 
* 90-10 percentile ratios for the gross earnings of full-time workers, male and female combined. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD Labour Market Statistics 
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What this discussion also underlines is the danger of being seduced by 
fashionable or mono-causal explanations. Whatever the reasons for the lack of real-
term growth in median college incomes in the US and in the UK or national 
differences in income inequalities, they cannot be explained in terms of globalisation 
or offshoring of skilled employment in any straightforward way. But what is worrying 
about the trends identified here is that they are likely to put increasing downward 
pressure on the incomes of many ‘knowledge’ workers. Moreover, the impact of 
globalisation will not be evenly spread throughout the workforce. If the brunt of 
international competition and technological innovation in the manufacturing sectors 
was borne by blue-collar workers, the next phase will not spare the middle classes. 
But the economic pain will not be evenly administered as the top 10 to 20 percent 
may continue to enjoy rising wages as the rest are forced to run even faster to do little 
more than stand still. 
 
Discussion 
This monograph has focussed on global trends in education, employment and income. 
It has also focused on Britain and the United States as both countries have offered a 
neo- liberal agenda of free trade and flexible labour markets. Within what we have 
called the ‘win-win’ scenario, the source of competitive advantage is through 
investment in human capital. Gary Becker (2002) believes that we have now entered 
the ‘age of human capital’: 
Human capital refers to the knowledge, information, ideas, skills, and 
health of individuals. This is the ‘age of human capital’ in the sense that 
human capital is by far the most important form of capital in modern 
economies. The economic successes of individuals, and also of whole 
economies, depend on how extensively and effectively people invest in 
themselves. 
These investments are assumed to give everyone an opportunity to improve their job, 
career and income prospects, as the developed economies compete for high-skilled, 
high-waged jobs while low-skilled employment is concentrated in emerging 
economies. 
Our analysis comes to a different conclusion. The policy framework based on 
human capital assumptions is fundamentally flawed. The available evidence suggests 
that relying on employability and supply-side policies is unlikely to deliver the high-
skills, high-wage vision of Britain or the United States. This is not to suggest that the 
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knowledge, skills and capabilities of the workforce are unimportant. As a senior 
British policy adviser observed, the focus on innovation and research was inevitable, 
because ‘what else could we do?’ However, the problem is that these high- level skills 
are becoming widely available across the globe. 
Human capital is itself subject to the laws of diminishing returns. It is losing 
its capacity as a source of competitive advantage, because the ‘positional’ advantage 
of those with higher education and skills is not only declining domestically (as higher 
education is expanded) but also globally (Brown, Lauder and Ashton, 2008). 
Governments in the developed economies are beginning to grasp the ways in which 
countries such as China and India are expanding their educational systems to compete 
for high-skilled work within key sectors of the global economy, along with trends 
towards the ‘offshoring’ of skilled, as well as semi-skilled and unskilled, jobs. Yet 
they are reluctant to recognise its full policy implications. 
Much current thinking about the relationship between education, jobs and 
rewards is based on an evolutionary model of skills upgrading and the rising value of 
investments in human capital. But the relationship between education and the labour 
market today looks more like a ‘transitional’ case, as access to tertiary education 
becomes more widespread both within and across countries. This global expansion of 
tertiary education has outstripped the demand for high-skilled workers, creating 
downward pressure on the incomes of skilled workers in the developed economies, 
along with some upward pressure on those in emerging economies. At the same time, 
there are trends towards ‘winner-takes-all’ markets, which reveal that people with 
similar qualifications in the same occupations, organisations and countries are 
experiencing increasing polarisation in future career prospects (Frank and Cook, 
1995). 
Our current research involving leading global corporations also suggests that 
the trends in corporate restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s have entered a new phase, 
based on the search for new sources of productive efficiency through leveraging the 
global economy, facilitated through advances in new information and process 
technologies. Such trends are captured in a PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005:2) report 
on offshoring in the financial services industry that concludes: 
Many in the industry believe that the distinction between offshoring and 
the sourcing of expertise and talent internationally will become 
increasingly blurred. As firms consider shifting higher value-added 
activities that require specific knowledge or head offshore to address skill 
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shortages in home markets, those that place greater emphasis on people 
and expertise will do better than those that are simply out to cut their 
costs. 
The paradox of human capital is that at a time when human knowledge is being 
taught, certified and applied on a scale never witnessed previously in human history, 
the overall value of human capital is likely to decline, apart from in the case of 
leading-edge knowledge that has clear market application. For the few, investments of 
effort, time and money will continue to be handsomely rewarded. But for most, it will 
take the form of defensive expenditure: it is a necessary investment to have any 
chance of getting a decent job (Brown, 2006). 
An unintended consequence of the application of human capital ideas to public 
and economic policy is that it is creating increasing problems in the management of 
expectations. The developed economies are in danger of creating a heady cocktail of 
discontent: students and their parents may find that a degree fails to deliver the 
standard of living they have been led to expect and employers will have too many 
over-qualified and disgruntled employees (Reich, 2003). The market situation for 
many non-graduates is dire, as opportunities for occupational mobility that were 
previously associated with working class careers are now in decline (Keep, 2004; 
Blanden, et al., 2005). 
Some remain hopeful that the increasing supply of higher-educated employees 
will generate its own demand as employees seek to exploit this surplus of ‘talent ’. The 
research evidence finds only modest support for such a view and it will do little to 
overcome the problem of over-qualification. Mason (2002:454) found that in the UK 
‘the scope for new job upgrading of a permanent kind in service industries now 
appears to be limited. Large numbers of jobs filled by non-mainstream graduates have 
not been modified in response to the greater availability of graduates’. 
Ultimately, the logic to global capitalism extends far beyond headline figures 
about offshoring or economic migrants. Competitive advantage cannot be achieved 
solely by raising educational standards or by sending more and more people to 
university. The problem confronting Western workers and governments is that the 
knowledge economy is not characterised by the rising value of knowledge as 
companies are not only attempting to do more with less but also to know more for less. 
While elites will continue to make spectacular returns on their personal investments, 
many so-called knowledge workers will be feeling the pinch. This is not limited to 
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their pay cheques, but also the wider benefit packages associated with managerial and 
professional employment – in the shape of healthcare, pensions, working hours, job 
security and career opportunities. What the developed economies are being forced to 
grapple with, even if they remain in a current state of denial, is that economic 
competition is based on quality and price. 
We require a new political economy that recognises that while economic 
globalisation places limits on the role of the state to shape market competition in the 
national interest, there is more room for manoeuvre than is commonly supposed in 
neo- liberal theory. The deregulation of global markets does not mean the inevitable 
deregulation of domestic institutions, including those relevant to education, work, 
welfare and the labour market. Varieties of ‘national’ capitalism continue to play a 
crucial part in shaping the relationship between education, jobs and rewards (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), although some aspects of this relationship have been called into 
question in our recent research (Lauder, et al., 2008). 
Our research on globalisation and the future of skills raises new questions that 
challenge much of the existing literature on the social foundations of economic 
performance, including our own theoretical work on national skill formation (Ashton 
and Green,1996; Brown, Green and Lauder, 2001), along with theories associated 
with the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach. This literature has assumed that the 
production of quality goods and services depend on particular ‘regimes of production’ 
such as the dual system of workplace and college training in Germany or high trust 
relations in the ‘third Italy’, that are difficult if not impossible to duplicate. But what 
companies have discovered as they experiment with higher end activities in lower cost 
countries, is that quality may not be impaired and may even be improved, although 
there were companies who retreated because they struggled to achieve the standards 
they required or due to fears about intellectual property rights. 
The view that it will take decades for developing economies to compete in the 
global market for high skilled jobs has also underestimated the speed of educational 
reform and business innovation. Our studies show that the assumption that hi-tech 
depends on social sophistication in the form of democratic politics, welfare provision 
and high GDP per capita, fails to capture the extreme forms of uneven development 
where the pre-industrial and the post- industrial share the same postcode. Sociological 
theories have typically assumed a close correspondence between societal and 
economic development, but business organisation is being turned ‘inside out’. While 
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companies need a decent infrastructure (roads, communications), and supply of well-
educated and motivated workers, they are able to set up ‘oasis operations’, high-tech 
factories, offices and research facilities in low-spec locations (Brown, Lauder and 
Ashton, 2008). Here, our argument is not that varieties of capitalism have given way 
to a universal or convergence model, but rather that na tional ‘varieties’ explains less 
than is typically claimed. A key question is how companies achieve common quality 
standards within the ‘varieties’ of capitalism. 
This does not negate the importance of societal differences in the way 
education, jobs and rewards are institutionally organised in, say, Britain as opposed to 
Germany, Singapore or China. Differences remain in the way policy-makers 
understand economic globalisation and its policy implications. In Germany, for 
instance, globalisation may be seen as a threat to its model of social partnership, 
especially in terms of the dual system of training, whereas in Britain it is seen as 
consistent with a commitment to a flexible labour market. It highlights how national 
responses to globalisation take place within very different political and institutional 
contexts. Indeed, even at the global level, the political regulations that structure world 
trade, such as those negotiated through the World Trade Organisation, still exclude 
substantial national markets (for example, the domestic agricultural markets protected 
by the US and EU) from effective international trade. 
It is estimated that European dairy farmers received US$2.20 per day for each 
cow, therefore ‘the average cow in a rich country now receives more income per day 
than half the world’s population’.48 In addition, many of the least developed countries 
of the world, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, remain outside world markets.49  
All this serves to remind us that the protagonists of economic globalisation and ‘free 
trade’ have a long way to go to create viable trading conditions that would allow 
many developing countries to raise productivity and sell on world markets. 
At the national level, fears of job losses and economic recession have led to 
calls to limit the offshoring of ‘American’ jobs, although 60 percent of goods 
exported from China come from the US and other foreign-owned multinationals that 
offshored their manufacturing activities to reduce costs (Stewart, 2005). Several US 
states passed laws prohibiting the export of such public-sector jobs.50 In January 2004, 
the US Senate passed an amendment that prevented private-sector companies from 
using offshore workers in order to compete against government workers on some 
contracts. While this only applied to the US Treasury and the Department of 
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Transportation, it highlights the US government’s attempt to limit the political 
damage caused by the accusation that the federal state is not protecting the economic 
interests of America workers, especially the middle classes. In August 2007, Barack 
Obama announced the Patriot Employers Act, aimed at rewarding companies that give 
priority to American workers. Obama states that ‘instead of providing incentives for 
employers to outsource and move their headquarters overseas, we should encourage 
corporations to be patriot employers that create good jobs with good benefits for 
American workers… Patriot employers help maintain American competitiveness in 
the global marketplace, while keeping our workforce and our middle class strong. 51 In 
the UK the offshoring of jobs is yet to become a major political issue, but this is likely 
to change as Britain enters a period of economic recession. 
Other commentators will continue to argue that by increasing competition and 
lowering the prices of inputs, international trade can generate higher productivity. In 
the IT sector, for example, Mann argues that the application of cheaper foreign skills 
in this area will reduce the price of software, making it more widely available to 
smaller employers in the US and thereby drive up their skill and service levels. Some 
jobs will disappear in the software industry, but the broader diffusion of IT throughout 
the economy will generate higher levels of economic activity: the same process that 
we have observed in the past in manufacturing (Mann, 2003). 
Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert (2008) view policies such as the Patriot 
Employers Act as misguided protectionism as it, ‘seeks to transfer wealth from the 
truly downtrodden of the world to a limited number of favoured US workers: mainly 
those in once dominant manufacturing industries that have lost their global 
competitive edge. It is breathtaking hypocrisy to object to the often appalling 
conditions of work and employment in developing countries and emerging markets, 
including sweatshops and child labour, while at the same time trying to prevent the 
operation of the normal and effective mechanisms for remedying these deplorable 
circumstances: foreign direct investment, outsourcing, off-shoring and all other 
manifestations of free trade.’52 
Whatever the outcome of these debates and subsequent political actions, these 
new global conditions do have important implications for the parameters of political 
debate. Our analysis shows that the dominant neo-liberal discourse based on the ‘win-
win’ scenario is in many respects based on a set of assumptions that are no longer 
valid. There is also nothing inevitable about the path to further global economic 
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integration. The politics of free trade are as important as the economics of free trade. 
When its political price is perceived to outweigh its economic benefits, historical 
precedent suggests that powerful nations will seek to protect their markets, companies 
and workers from international competition. A survey for the United Nations World 
Investment Report (2005) found that leading transnational companies considered 
protectionism and slow growth in the developed economies as the biggest threat to 
future foreign direct investment (UNCTAD, 2005).53 
Harold James also reminds us that we have been here before even if new 
political institutions, such as the World Bank, World Trade Organisation and the 
International Labour Office, have emerged to meet changing political conditions. 
James notes that ‘there has already been highly developed and highly integrated 
international communities that dissolve under the pressure of unexpected events. But 
in every case the momentum was lost; the pendulum swung back’ (James, 2002:1). He 
points to the collapse of the Renaissance and the international economy of the late 
19th century following the Great Depression of the 1920s. 
The economic nationalism that characterised Western countries after the 
Second World War was designed to spread the benefits of economic growth to the 
majority rather than the few by introducing fiscal controls and trade restrictions at the 
national level. The more the middle classes view the current experiment in 
globalisation as a threat rather than an opportunity, the greater the likelihood of 
domestic political reaction. Indeed, it seems inevitable that the political opposition to 
further economic globalisation will grow unless ways can be found to distribute the 
fruits of economic prosperity more widely (Brown and Lauder, 2006). This is now 
being widely recognised as Lawrence Summers, the former US Treasury Secretary 
argues in his defence of globalisation, ‘the domestic component of a strategy to 
promote healthy globalisation must rely on strengthening efforts to reduce inequality 
and insecurity. The international component must focus on the interests of working 
people in all countries, in addition to the current emphasis on the priorities of global 
corporations.’ 54 
 
Conclusion 
This monograph points to a future situation in which the competition for the ‘best’ 
jobs is likely to intensify and the returns to skill for many will fall. The rapid increase 
in the domestic and global supply of university graduates is changing the terms of 
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trade in the production of higher value-added goods and services. It suggests that the 
distinction between competition based on quality or price is increasingly redundant. 
As the supply of high-skilled work expands, the new competition is based on quality 
and price. This poses major problems for individuals and families in the developed 
economies and for national governments that have embraced the political arithmetic 
of high skills = high wages. 
In view of this, it is important that we start to change the terms of the political 
debate to embrace this likely scenario and think about how public policy can help 
create a competitive economy and tackle labour market (who does what) and 
distributional (who gets what) problems. The question is how people are individually 
and collectively engaged in innovative and enterprising activities that cannot be easily 
performed elsewhere. It is the societal, regional or local ‘capacity’ for high-skill 
utilisation that counts, rather than merely increasing the supply of employable 
graduates.55 
However, the great doubling in the global workforce identified by Richard 
Freeman, and the great doubling in global university enrolments discussed here, 
present policy analysts with a great reckoning. Investment in high skills will not 
create the high skilled, high waged economy of the future. We need a different policy 
framework that begins with the question of how to achieve prosperity and social 
justice after the death of human capital as we have come to understand it.  The 
political debate must, therefore, move on to consider the types of policies required to 
sustain economic growth, social justice and a cohesive society, when having large 
numbers of highly educated workers is no longer enough. We are not saying that skills 
are irrelevant, that is nonsense, but it is the role of skills (and education) in our 
understanding of productivity, prosperity and competitive advantage that is being 
transformed. How should developed economies respond to the competitive challenge 
now poses by the global supply of high skilled, low cost workers in developing 
economies? 
Whatever answer we eventually present will need to connect questions of both 
wealth generation and wealth distribution, as these cannot be resolved through 
national or global labour markets mechanisms. It is also going to be virtually 
impossible to focus solely on maintaining the prosperity of developed economies 
without account of the hopes, ambitions and prosperity of workers around the world. 
This will be forced upon us given the sheer weight of economic numbers emerging 
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from China and India, but also Brazil, Russia, Vietnam, etc. Now China has pursued a 
Western-style growth model, but on a mind-boggling scale, it will be difficult to 
constrain both domestically and internationally. While we worry about individual 
prosperity and its relationship to national prosperity, we will also need to pay 
attention to human capability on a global scale and how it can be deployed to achieve 
sustainable global prosperity and used to create a shared prosperity across all nations. 
The scale of these issues is difficult to exaggerate. Recent figures compiled by the 
ILO (2008) show that ‘there are 486.7 million workers in the world who do not earn 
enough to lift themselves and their families above the US$1 a day poverty line and 1.3 
billion workers do not earn enough to lift themselves and their family above the US$2 
a day line. In other words, despite working, more than four out of ten workers are 
poor’ (2008:10). 
Finally, this monograph highlights a great deal of uncertainty and warns 
against jumping to conclusions. The consequences of increasing global economic 
integration are uneven, raising doubts about the claims of protagonists on either side 
of the globalisation debate. The main purpose here is to get a better grasp of the 
issues, based on the available comparative data. 
The imminent prospect of a high-skilled, low-waged workforce being 
extended to developed economies should not be exaggerated. But our analysis should 
serve as a wake-up call. To date, there is little evidence of a significant decline in the 
‘average’ incomes for those in managerial and professional jobs, although there has 
been a small decline in the starting salaries for British graduates. Yet most of us live 
as ‘fugitives from the law of averages’, as many of those with the same level of 
education and training have vastly different jobs, rewards and career prospects. 
Around a third of British university graduates report being over-qualified for the jobs 
they are doing, with its knock-on effects on earnings and life chances. The pressure on 
wages is also disguised by longer working hours for the same pay, in increasingly 
results-driven jobs, offering little occupational security and intense competition for 
promotion, and with an erosion of occupational pensions. 
There is an urgent need to evaluate the future of high skills from a global 
perspective. The implicit notion that Britain or America will become ‘magnet’ 
economies for high-skilled, high-waged work seems overly optimistic in light of this 
review. Without a detailed risk assessment, it is difficult to ident ify trends or know 
how to respond. World events do not wait for researchers, policy-makers or 
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politicians, to deliver answers. In the meantime, it is crucial that we use our existing 
knowledge to rethink the parameters of the political debate to start exploring more 
effective responses to the new reality of the global market for skills. 
While it is difficult to predict the future, the trends identified in this paper 
appear to mark the beginning of a profound economic transformation. Before leaving 
office, Tony Blair gave a speech on the impact of globalisation and economic change, 
in which he stated: 
The character of this changing world is indifferent to tradition. 
Unforgiving to frailty. No respecter of past reputations. It has no custom 
and practice. It is replete with opportunities, but only go to those swift to 
adapt, slow to complain, open, willing and able to change. Unless we 
‘own’ the future, unless our values are matched by a completely honest 
understanding of the reality now upon us and the next about to hit us, we 
will fail.56 
The issues we confront are not about honesty but about empirical realities. What is 
undoubtedly correct is that unless we have a better understanding of socio-economic 
change beyond our national borders, our policy prescriptions will fail. 
 
Phillip Brown is a distinguished research professor in the School of Social 
Sciences at Cardiff University. Hugh Lauder is professor of education and 
political economy in the Department of Education at the University of Bath. 
David Ashton is an honorary professor in the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff 
University. Gerbrand Tholen is a doctoral student in the School of Social 
Sciences at Cardiff University. 
Contact Address: BrownP1@cardiff.ac.uk
  57 
References 
Andriano, J.D. (2008) ‘Politics of Poverty in the Philippines’, Asia Times online, 
March 21. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JC21Ae01.html 
Ashton, D. and Green, F. (1996) Education, Training and the Global Economy, 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Ashton, D., Green, F., James, D. and Sung, J. (1999) Education and Training for 
Development: The Political Economy of Skill Formation in East Asian Newly 
Industrialised Economies, London: Routledge. 
Becker, G. S. (2002) ‘The age of human capital’, in Edward, P. Lazear (ed.) 
Education in the Twenty-First Century, Hoover Institute: Stanford University. 
Blanden, J., Gregg, P. and Machin, S. (2005) Intergenerational Mobility in Europe 
and North America, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of 
Economics. http://cep.lse.ac.uk/about/news/IntergenerationalMobility.pdf 
Brown, G. (2008) ‘We’ll Use Our Schools to Break Down Class Barriers’, The 
Observer, February 10. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/10/gordonbrown.education 
Brown, P. and Hesketh, A. (2004) The Mismanagement of Talent: Employability and 
Jobs in the Knowledge Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Brown, P. (2003) ‘The opportunity trap: education and employment in a global 
economy’, European Education Research Journal, 2 (1) pp.141-79. 
Brown, P. and Lauder, H. (2001) Capitalism and Social Progress: The Future of 
Society in a Global Economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Brown, P. and Lauder, H. (2006) ‘Globalization, Knowledge and the Myth of the 
Magnet Economy’, Globalization, Societies and Education, 4,1,25-57. 
Brown, P., Lauder, H. & Ashton, D. (2008) ‘Education, Globalisation and the Future 
of the Knowledge Economy’, European Educational Research Journal, 
7,2,131-56. 
Brown, P., Green, A. and Lauder, H. (2001) High Skills: Globalization, 
Competitiveness and Skill Formation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Brown, P. and Tannock, S. (forthcoming) ‘Education, Meritocracy and the Global 
War for Talent’, Journal of Education Policy. 
Carvel, J .(2004) ‘Nursing drive “like people trafficking”’, The Guardian, 12 May. 
Couto, V., Mani, M., Lewin, A.Y., Peeters, C. (2006) The Globalization of White-
Collar Work: The Facts and Fallout of Next-Generation Offshoring, 
BoozAllenHamilton (BAH)/Duke University. 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) (2003) The Future of Higher Education, 
London: HMSO. 
Drucker, P. (1993) Post-Capitalist Society, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Florida, Richard (2005) The Flight of the Creative Class. New York: Harper Business. 
Freeman, R. (2006) The Great Doubling: The Challenge of the New Global Labour 
Market, 
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/eichengreen/e183_sp07/great_doub.pdf 
  58 
Frank, R. R. and Cook, P. J. (1995) The Winner-Takes-All Society, New York: Free 
Press. 
Gray, J. (1998) False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism, London: Granta 
Books. 
Green, F, McIntosh, S. and Vignoles, A. (1999) ‘Over-education and skills – 
clarifying the concepts’, paper given at the EEEG group annual conference, 
University of Wales, Swansea, July, 1999, 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ilr/eeeg/vignoles.pdf 
Green, F and Zhu, Y. (2007) ‘Overqualification, Job Dissatisfaction and Increasing 
Dispersion in the Returns to Graduate Education’, MHRLdp005, Manpower 
Human Resources Lab, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
Gupta, R. J. (2005) ‘India’s economic agenda: an interview with Manmohan Singh’, 
McKinsey Quarterly, Special Edition: Fulfilling India’s Promise, 
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/ 
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2001) (Eds.) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economic and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hesketh, A. (2005) The Knowledge-Based Economy in Wales: A Comparative 
Analysis, National Assembly of Wales, Report for the Independent Study into 
the Devolution of the Student Support System and Tuition Fee Regime in Wales 
(The Rees Review), Cardiff: Welsh Assembly Government. 
Hirsch, F. (1977) The Social Limits to Growth, London: Routledge 
House of Lords (2008) The Economic Impact of Migration, Volumes 1, Select 
Committee on Economic Affairs, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldeconaf.htm 
International Labour Office (ILO) (2008) Global Employment Trends: 2008, Geneva: 
ILO. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007) World Economic Outlook: Spillovers and 
Cycles in the Global Economy, April, 
http://www.imf.org/externa l/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/index.htm 
Jackson, R. and Howe, N. (2003) The 2003 aging vulnerability index: an assessment 
of the capacity of twelve developed countries to meet the aging challenge, The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March. 
http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC11853.htm  
James, H. (2002) The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Keep, E. (2004) ‘The economic and distributional implications of current policies on 
higher education’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20 (2) 298-314 
Lauder, H., Brown, P. and Ashton, D. (2008) ‘Globalisation, Skill Formation and the 
Varieties of Capitalism Approach’, New Political Economy, 13, 1, 19-35. 
  59 
Lauder, H., Egerton, M. and Brown, P. (2005) A Report on Graduate Earnings: 
Theory and Empirical Analysis, Report for the Independent Study into the 
Devolution of the Student Support System and Tuition Fee Regime in Wales 
(The Rees Review), Cardiff: Welsh Assembly Government. 
Mann, C. L. (2003), Globalization of IT Services and White Collar Jobs: The Next 
Wave of Productivity Growth, Institute for International Economics, 
International Economic Policy Briefs, No. PB03-11, December. 
http://www.iie.com 
Mason, G. (2002) ‘High skills utilization under mass higher education: graduate 
employment in service industry’, Journal of Education and Work, 15 (4) 427-
56. 
Meisler, A. (2004) ‘Thinking globally, act rationally”, Workforce Management, 
http://www.workforce.com/section/09/feature/23/59/24/index 
Michaels, E., Handfield-Jones, H. and Axelrod, B. (2001) The War for Talent, 
Boston: Harvard University Press. 
Miller, K. L. (2003)‘Profits without people’, Newsweek, November 10, Atlantic 
edition, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/ 
Neef, D. (1998) (Ed.) The Knowledge Economy, Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
OECD (2007) Moving UP the Value Chain: Staying Competitive in the Global 
Economy. Main Findings. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/35/38558080.pdf 
Ohmae, K. (2000) The Invisible Continent: Four Strategic Imperatives of the New 
Economy, London: Nicholas Brealey, 
Ohmae, K. (1990) The Borderless World, London: Collins. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005) ‘Offshoring in the financial services industry: risks 
and rewards’, http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/ 
2711A28073EC82238525706C001EAEC4 
Purcell, K. (2002) Qualifications and Careers: Equal Opportunities and Earnings 
Among Graduates, Working Paper Series, No.1, Equal Opportunities 
Commission, http://www.eoc.org.uk/research 
Reich, R. (1991) The Work of Nations, London: Simon & Schuster. 
Reich, R. (2003) ‘Get a job’, http://www.robertreich.org/reich/20030519.asp 
Rifkin, J. (2004) The End of Work, 2nd Edition, New York: TarcherPenguin. 
De Rivero, O. (2001) The Myth of Development, London: Zen. 
Salzman, H. (2007) ‘Globalization of R&D and Innovation: Implications for U.S. 
STEM Workforce and Policy’, Statement submitted to the Committee on 
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives. 
Saxenian, A. ‘Transnational communities and the evolution of global production 
networks: the cases of Taiwan, China and India ’, Industry and Innovation, Fall 
2002. 
Saxenian, A.L. (2006) The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global 
Economy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Seager, A. ‘Why Bush is on the Carpet with Hoover’, The Guardian, 23 August 2004. 
  60 
Stewart, H. (2005) ‘The west sees red’, The Observer, 12 June. 
Streeck, W. (1997) ‘German capitalism: does it exist? can it survive?’ New Political 
Economy, 2 (2) 237-56. 
Thurow, L. (1977) ‘Education and economic equa lity’, in Karabel, J. and Halsey, A. 
H., (Eds.) Power and Ideology in Education, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Trifonova, E. (2003) ‘Hi-Tech Booms in Russia While It Bombs in the West’, 
Development Outreach, World Bank Institute, March, 
http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/march03/article.asp?id=195 
Trombly, M (2003) ‘There’s a treasure trove of scientific talent – and lots of 
government bureaucracy’, Computer World, 15 September, http://www.comp 
uterworld.com/managementtopics/outsourcing/story/0,10801,84874,00.html 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2005) World 
Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the 
Internationalization of R&D, http://www.unctad.org/wir 
Venter, K., Ashton, D. N. and Sung, J. (2002) Education and Skills in the People’s 
Republic of China: Employers’ Perceptions, ILO/CLMS, University of 
Leicester, 2002. 
Wolf, M. (2004) Why Globalization Works, London: Yale University Press. 
  61 
Appendix 1 
Figure A1: Foreign and total employment of top 100 non-financial MNCs for 
1995, 2000 and 2005 (thousands) 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 1997, pp29-31; 2002, pp.86-88; 2007, pp.229-231 
 
Figure A2: Foreign and total assets of 40 MNCs for 1995, 2002 and 2005 (in 
thousands) 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 1997, pp29-31; 2002, pp.86-88; 2007, pp.229-231 
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Figure A3: Foreign and total employment of 40 MNCs for 1995, 2002 and 2005 
(in thousands) 
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 1997, pp29-31; 2002, pp.86-88; 2007, pp.229-231 
 
Figure A4: Share of foreign employment and share of foreign assets of 40 MNCs 
for 1995, 2000 and 2005 (in percent) 
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 1997, pp29-31; 2002, pp.86-88; 2007, pp.229-231 
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Table A1: List of 41 companies from developed economies, consistently in the top 
100 between 1995 and 2005 
1 BASF Germany Chemicals 
2 Bayer Germany Pharmaceuticals 
3 BMW Germany Motor vehicles 
4 Carrefour France Retail 
5 ChevronTexaco United States Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 
6 Coca-Cola Company United States Food & beverages 
7 DaimlerChrysler Germany/United States Motor vehicles 
8 Dow Chemical Company United States Chemicals 
9 Eni Group Italy Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 
10 Exxon Mobil Corporation United States Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 
11 Fiat Spa Italy Motor vehicles 
12 Ford Motor Company United States Motor vehicles 
13 General Electric  United States Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
14 General Motors United States Motor vehicles 
15 Glaxosmithkline United Kingdom Pharmaceuticals 
16 Hewlett-Packard United States Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
17 Hitachi Japan Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
18 Honda Motor Company Japan Motor vehicles 
19 IBM United States Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
20 Johnson & Johnson United States Pharmaceuticals 
21 Marubeni Corporation Japan Wholesale trade 
22 Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Company 
Japan Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
23 McDonald’s Corporation United States Retail/Restaurants 
24 Mitsubishi Motors 
Corporation 
Japan Motor vehicles 
25 Mitsui & Company Japan Wholesale trade 
27 Nestlé  Switzerland Food & beverages 
28 Nissan Motor Company Japan Motor vehicles 
29 Philips Electronics Netherlands Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
30 Procter & Gamble  United States Diversified 
31 Renault France Motor vehicles 
32 Roche Group Switzerland Pharmaceuticals 
33 Royal Dutch/Shell Group United Kingdom/ 
Netherlands 
Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 
34 Siemens Germany Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
35 Sony Corporation Japan Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
36 Thomson Corporation Canada Media 
37 Total Fina Elf France Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 
38 Toyota Motor Corporation Japan Motor vehic les 
39 Unilever United Kingdom/ 
Netherlands 
Diversified 
40 Volkswagen Group Germany Motor vehicles 
41 Volvo Sweden Motor vehicles 
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Table A2: The 21 transnational corporations in the top fifty from developing 
economies 
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1 Hutchison Whampoa Hong Kong, China Diversified
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3 LG Electronics Korea, Republic of Electrical & electronic equipment
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5 Petronas Malaysia Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
6 New World Development Co. Hong Kong, China Diversified
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21 Companhia Vale Do Rio Doce Brazil Mining & quarrying
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